This commit fixes a weakness of the key-encryption-key
derivation for SSE-C encrypted objects. Before this
change the key-encryption-key was not bound to / didn't
depend on the object path. This allows an attacker to
repalce objects - encrypted with the same
client-key - with each other.
This change fixes this issue by updating the
key-encryption-key derivation to include:
- the domain (in this case SSE-C)
- a canonical object path representation
- the encryption & key derivation algorithm
Changing the object path now causes the KDF to derive a
different key-encryption-key such that the object-key
unsealing fails.
Including the domain (SSE-C) and encryption & key
derivation algorithm is not directly neccessary for this
fix. However, both will be included for the SSE-S3 KDF.
So they are included here to avoid updating the KDF
again when we add SSE-S3.
The leagcy KDF 'DARE-SHA256' is only used for existing
objects and never for new objects / key rotation.
This commit limits the amount of memory allocated by the
S3 Multi-Object-Delete-API. The server used to allocate as
many bytes as provided by the client using Content-Length.
S3 specifies that the S3 Multi-Object-Delete-API can delete
at most 1000 objects using a single request.
(See: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/multiobjectdeleteapi.html)
Since the maximum S3 object name is limited to 1024 bytes the
XML body sent by the client can only contain up to 1000 * 1024
bytes (excluding XML format overhead).
This commit limits the size of the parsed XML for the S3
Multi-Object-Delete-API to 2 MB. This fixes a DoS
vulnerability since (auth.) clients, MitM-adversaries
(without TLS) and un-auth. users accessing buckets allowing
multi-delete by policy can kill the server.
This behavior is similar to the AWS-S3 implementation.
This PR adds CopyObject support for objects residing in buckets
in different Minio instances (where Minio instances are part of
a federated setup).
Also, added support for multiple Minio domain IPs. This is required
for distributed deployments, where one deployment may have multiple
nodes, each with a different public IP.
Buckets already present on a Minio server before it joins a
bucket federated deployment will now be added to etcd during
startup. In case of a bucket name collision, admin is informed
via Minio server console message.
Added configuration migration for configuration stored in etcd
backend.
Also, environment variables are updated and ListBucket path style
request is no longer forwarded.
- remove old bucket policy handling
- add new policy handling
- add new policy handling unit tests
This patch brings support to bucket policy to have more control not
limiting to anonymous. Bucket owner controls to allow/deny any rest
API.
For example server side encryption can be controlled by allowing
PUT/GET objects with encryptions including bucket owner.
This PR adds disk based edge caching support for minio server.
Cache settings can be configured in config.json to take list of disk drives,
cache expiry in days and file patterns to exclude from cache or via environment
variables MINIO_CACHE_DRIVES, MINIO_CACHE_EXCLUDE and MINIO_CACHE_EXPIRY
Design assumes that Atime support is enabled and the list of cache drives is
fixed.
- Objects are cached on both GET and PUT/POST operations.
- Expiry is used as hint to evict older entries from cache, or if 80% of cache
capacity is filled.
- When object storage backend is down, GET, LIST and HEAD operations fetch
object seamlessly from cache.
Current Limitations
- Bucket policies are not cached, so anonymous operations are not supported in
offline mode.
- Objects are distributed using deterministic hashing among list of cache
drives specified.If one or more drives go offline, or cache drive
configuration is altered - performance could degrade to linear lookup.
Fixes#4026
This is a trival fix to support server level WORM. The feature comes
with an environment variable `MINIO_WORM`.
Usage:
```
$ export MINIO_WORM=on
$ minio server endpoint
```
This PR implements an object layer which
combines input erasure sets of XL layers
into a unified namespace.
This object layer extends the existing
erasure coded implementation, it is assumed
in this design that providing > 16 disks is
a static configuration as well i.e if you started
the setup with 32 disks with 4 sets 8 disks per
pack then you would need to provide 4 sets always.
Some design details and restrictions:
- Objects are distributed using consistent ordering
to a unique erasure coded layer.
- Each pack has its own dsync so locks are synchronized
properly at pack (erasure layer).
- Each pack still has a maximum of 16 disks
requirement, you can start with multiple
such sets statically.
- Static sets set of disks and cannot be
changed, there is no elastic expansion allowed.
- Static sets set of disks and cannot be
changed, there is no elastic removal allowed.
- ListObjects() across sets can be noticeably
slower since List happens on all servers,
and is merged at this sets layer.
Fixes#5465Fixes#5464Fixes#5461Fixes#5460Fixes#5459Fixes#5458Fixes#5460Fixes#5488Fixes#5489Fixes#5497Fixes#5496
This change introduces following simplified steps to follow
during config migration.
```
// Steps to move from version N to version N+1
// 1. Add new struct serverConfigVN+1 in config-versions.go
// 2. Set configCurrentVersion to "N+1"
// 3. Set serverConfigCurrent to serverConfigVN+1
// 4. Add new migration function (ex. func migrateVNToVN+1()) in config-migrate.go
// 5. Call migrateVNToVN+1() from migrateConfig() in config-migrate.go
// 6. Make changes in config-current_test.go for any test change
```
S3 spec requires that MethodNotAllowed error be return if object name is part
of the URL.
Fix postpolicy related unit tests to not set object name as part of target URL.
Fixes#5141
Verify() was being called by caller after the data
has been successfully read after io.EOF. This disconnection
opens a race under concurrent access to such an object.
Verification is not necessary outside of Read() call,
we can simply just do checksum verification right inside
Read() call at io.EOF.
This approach simplifies the usage.
This change refactor the ObjectLayer PutObject and PutObjectPart
functions. Instead of passing an io.Reader and a size to PUT operations
ObejectLayer expects an HashReader.
A HashReader verifies the MD5 sum (and SHA256 sum if required) of the object.
This change updates all all PutObject(Part) calls and removes unnecessary code
in all ObjectLayer implementations.
Fixes#4923
This PR fixes the issue of cleaning up in-memory state
properly. Without this PR we can lead to security
situations where new bucket would inherit wrong
permissions on bucket and expose objects erroneously.
Fixes#4714
Fixed header-to-metadat extraction. The extractMetadataFromHeader function should return an error if the http.Header contains a non-canonicalized key. The reason is that the keys can be manually set (through a map access) which can lead to ugly bugs.
Also fixed header-to-metadata extraction. Return a InternalError if a non-canonicalized key is found in a http.Header. Also log the error.
This PR also does backend format change to 1.0.1
from 1.0.0. Backward compatible changes are still
kept to read the 'md5Sum' key. But all new objects
will be stored with the same details under 'etag'.
Fixes#4312
Separate out validating v/s parsing logic in
isValidLocationConstraint() into parseLocationConstraint()
and isValidLocation()
Additionally also set `X-Amz-Bucket-Region` as part of the
common headers for the clients to fallback on in-case of any
region related errors.
This change adds information like host, port and user-agent of the
client whose request triggered an event notification.
E.g, if someone uploads an object to a bucket using mc. If notifications
were configured on that bucket, the host, port and user-agent of mc
would be sent as part of event notification data.
Sample output:
```
"source": {
"host": "127.0.0.1",
"port": "55808",
"userAgent": "Minio (linux; amd64) minio-go/2.0.4 mc ..."
}
```
This change is cleanup of the postPolicyHandler code
primarily to address the flow and also converting
certain critical parts into self contained functions.