This commit refactors the code in `cmd/crypto`
and separates SSE-S3, SSE-C and SSE-KMS.
This commit should not cause any behavior change
except for:
- `IsRequested(http.Header)`
which now returns the requested type {SSE-C, SSE-S3,
SSE-KMS} and does not consider SSE-C copy headers.
However, SSE-C copy headers alone are anyway not valid.
additionally also configure http2 healthcheck
values to quickly detect unstable connections
and let them timeout.
also use single transport for proxying requests
`decryptObjectInfo` is a significant bottleneck when listing objects.
Reduce the allocations for a significant speedup.
https://github.com/minio/sio/pull/40
```
λ benchcmp before.txt after.txt
benchmark old ns/op new ns/op delta
Benchmark_decryptObjectInfo-32 24260928 808656 -96.67%
benchmark old MB/s new MB/s speedup
Benchmark_decryptObjectInfo-32 0.04 1.24 31.00x
benchmark old allocs new allocs delta
Benchmark_decryptObjectInfo-32 75112 48996 -34.77%
benchmark old bytes new bytes delta
Benchmark_decryptObjectInfo-32 287694772 4228076 -98.53%
```
This commit fixes a performance issue caused
by too many calls to the external KMS - i.e.
for single-part PUT requests.
In general, the issue is caused by a sub-optimal
code structure. In particular, when the server
encrypts an object it requests a new data encryption
key from the KMS. With this key it does some key
derivation and encrypts the object content and
ETag.
However, to behave S3-compatible the MinIO server
has to return the plaintext ETag to the client
in case SSE-S3.
Therefore, the server code used to decrypt the
(previously encrypted) ETag again by requesting
the data encryption key (KMS decrypt API) from
the KMS.
This leads to 2 KMS API calls (1 generate key and
1 decrypt key) per PUT operation - while only
one KMS call is necessary.
This commit fixes this by fetching a data key only
once from the KMS and keeping the derived object
encryption key around (for the lifetime of the request).
This leads to a significant performance improvement
w.r.t. to PUT workloads:
```
Operation: PUT
Operations: 161 -> 239
Duration: 28s -> 29s
* Average: +47.56% (+25.8 MiB/s) throughput, +47.56% (+2.6) obj/s
* Fastest: +55.49% (+34.5 MiB/s) throughput, +55.49% (+3.5) obj/s
* 50% Median: +58.24% (+32.8 MiB/s) throughput, +58.24% (+3.3) obj/s
* Slowest: +1.83% (+0.6 MiB/s) throughput, +1.83% (+0.1) obj/s
```
This is a precursor change before versioning,
removes/deprecates the requirement of remembering
partName and partETag which are not useful after
a multipart transaction has finished.
This PR reduces the overall size of the backend
JSON for large file uploads.
This PR adds pass-through, single encryption at gateway and double
encryption support (gateway encryption with pass through of SSE
headers to backend).
If KMS is set up (either with Vault as KMS or using
MINIO_SSE_MASTER_KEY),gateway will automatically perform
single encryption. If MINIO_GATEWAY_SSE is set up in addition to
Vault KMS, double encryption is performed.When neither KMS nor
MINIO_GATEWAY_SSE is set, do a pass through to backend.
When double encryption is specified, MINIO_GATEWAY_SSE can be set to
"C" for SSE-C encryption at gateway and backend, "S3" for SSE-S3
encryption at gateway/backend or both to support more than one option.
Fixes#6323, #6696
To conform with AWS S3 Spec on ETag for SSE-S3 encrypted objects,
encrypt client sent MD5Sum and store it on backend as ETag.Extend
this behavior to SSE-C encrypted objects.
Multipart object final size is not a contiguous
encrypted object representation, so trying to
decrypt this size will lead to an error in some
cases. The multipart object should be detected first
and then decoded with its respective parts instead.
This PR handles this situation properly, added a
test as well to detect these in the future.
This commit moves the check that SSE-C requests
must be made over TLS into a generic HTTP handler.
Since the HTTP server uses custom TCP connection handling
it is not possible to use `http.Request.TLS` to check
for TLS connections. So using `globalIsSSL` is the only
option to detect whether the request is made over TLS.
By extracting this check into a separate handler it's possible
to refactor other parts of the SSE handling code further.
The new call combines GetObjectInfo and GetObject, and returns an
object with a ReadCloser interface.
Also adds a number of end-to-end encryption tests at the handler
level.
Add support for sse-s3 encryption with vault as KMS.
Also refactoring code to make use of headers and functions defined in
crypto package and clean up duplicated code.
This commit fixes a weakness of the key-encryption-key
derivation for SSE-C encrypted objects. Before this
change the key-encryption-key was not bound to / didn't
depend on the object path. This allows an attacker to
repalce objects - encrypted with the same
client-key - with each other.
This change fixes this issue by updating the
key-encryption-key derivation to include:
- the domain (in this case SSE-C)
- a canonical object path representation
- the encryption & key derivation algorithm
Changing the object path now causes the KDF to derive a
different key-encryption-key such that the object-key
unsealing fails.
Including the domain (SSE-C) and encryption & key
derivation algorithm is not directly neccessary for this
fix. However, both will be included for the SSE-S3 KDF.
So they are included here to avoid updating the KDF
again when we add SSE-S3.
The leagcy KDF 'DARE-SHA256' is only used for existing
objects and never for new objects / key rotation.
*) Add Put/Get support of multipart in encryption
*) Add GET Range support for encryption
*) Add CopyPart encrypted support
*) Support decrypting of large single PUT object
This chnage replaces the current SSE-C key derivation scheme. The 'old'
scheme derives an unique object encryption key from the client provided key.
This key derivation was not invertible. That means that a client cannot change
its key without changing the object encryption key.
AWS S3 allows users to update there SSE-C keys by executing a SSE-C COPY with
source == destination. AWS probably updates just the metadata (which is a very
cheap operation). The old key derivation scheme would require a complete copy
of the object because the minio server would not be able to derive the same
object encryption key from a different client provided key (without breaking
the crypto. hash function).
This change makes the key derivation invertible.
This change adds server-side-encryption support for HEAD, GET and PUT
operations. This PR only addresses single-part PUTs and GETs without
HTTP ranges.
Further this change adds the concept of reserved object metadata which is required
to make encrypted objects tamper-proof and provide API compatibility to AWS S3.
This PR adds the following reserved metadata entries:
- X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Iv ('guarantees' tamper-proof property)
- X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Kdf (makes Key-MAC computation negotiable in future)
- X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Key-Mac (provides AWS S3 API compatibility)
The prefix `X-Minio_Internal` specifies an internal metadata entry which must not
send to clients. All client requests containing a metadata key starting with `X-Minio-Internal`
must also rejected. This is implemented by a generic-handler.
This PR implements SSE-C separated from client-side-encryption (CSE). This cannot decrypt
server-side-encrypted objects on the client-side. However, clients can encrypted the same object
with CSE and SSE-C.
This PR does not address:
- SSE-C Copy and Copy part
- SSE-C GET with HTTP ranges
- SSE-C multipart PUT
- SSE-C Gateway
Each point must be addressed in a separate PR.
Added to vendor dir:
- x/crypto/chacha20poly1305
- x/crypto/poly1305
- github.com/minio/sio
Andreas Auernhammer