This PR is a continuation from #9586, now the
entire parsing logic is fully merged into
bucket metadata sub-system, simplify the
quota API further by reducing the remove
quota handler implementation.
this is a major overhaul by migrating off all
bucket metadata related configs into a single
object '.metadata.bin' this allows us for faster
bootups across 1000's of buckets and as well
as keeps the code simple enough for future
work and additions.
Additionally also fixes#9396, #9394
We should allow quorum errors to be send upwards
such that caller can retry while reading bucket
encryption/policy configs when server is starting
up, this allows distributed setups to load the
configuration properly.
Current code didn't facilitate this and would have
never loaded the actual configs during rolling,
server restarts.
This PR also tries to simplify the approach taken in
object-locking implementation by preferential treatment
given towards full validation.
This in-turn has fixed couple of bugs related to
how policy should have been honored when ByPassGovernance
is provided.
Simplifies code a bit, but also duplicates code intentionally
for clarity due to complex nature of object locking
implementation.
This PR adds jsoniter package to replace encoding/json
in places where faster json unmarshal is necessary
whenever input JSON is large enough.
Some benchmarking comparison between jsoniter and enconding/json
benchmark old MB/s new MB/s speedup
BenchmarkParseUnmarshal/N10-4 110.02 331.17 3.01x
BenchmarkParseUnmarshal/N100-4 125.74 524.09 4.17x
BenchmarkParseUnmarshal/N500-4 131.68 542.60 4.12x
BenchmarkParseUnmarshal/N1000-4 133.93 514.88 3.84x
BenchmarkParseUnmarshal/N5000-4 122.10 415.36 3.40x
BenchmarkParseUnmarshal/N10000-4 132.13 403.90 3.06x
This PR refactors object layer handling such
that upon failure in sub-system initialization
server reaches a stage of safe-mode operation
wherein only certain API operations are enabled
and available.
This allows for fixing many scenarios such as
- incorrect configuration in vault, etcd,
notification targets
- missing files, incomplete config migrations
unable to read encrypted content etc
- any other issues related to notification,
policies, lifecycle etc
- This PR allows config KVS to be validated properly
without being affected by ENV overrides, rejects
invalid values during set operation
- Expands unit tests and refactors the error handling
for notification targets, returns error instead of
ignoring targets for invalid KVS
- Does all the prep-work for implementing safe-mode
style operation for MinIO server, introduces a new
global variable to toggle safe mode based operations
NOTE: this PR itself doesn't provide safe mode operations
Current master repeatedly calls ListBuckets() during
initialization of multiple sub-systems
Use single ListBuckets() call for each sub-system as
follows
- LifeCycle
- Policy
- Notification
It looks like from implementation point of view fastjson
parser pool doesn't behave the same way as expected
when dealing many `xl.json` from multiple disks.
The fastjson parser pool usage ends up returning incorrect
xl.json entries for checksums, with references pointing
to older entries. This led to the subtle bug where checksum
info is duplicated from a previous xl.json read of a different
file from different disk.
Previously the read/write lock applied both for gateway use cases as
well the object store use case. Nothing from sys is touched or looked
at in the gateway usecase though, so we don't need to lock. Don't lock
to make the gateway policy getting a little more efficient, particularly
as where this is called from (checkRequestAuthType) is quite common.
Inconsistencies can arise after applying bucket policies in
gateway mode, since all gateway instances do not share a
common shared state. This is by design to keep gateway as
shared nothing architecture.
This PR fixes such inconsistencies by reloading policy
if any from the backend.
Fixes#7723
This PR supports iam and bucket policies to have
policy variable replacements in resource and
condition key values.
For example
- ${aws:username}
- ${aws:userid}
This PR adds pass-through, single encryption at gateway and double
encryption support (gateway encryption with pass through of SSE
headers to backend).
If KMS is set up (either with Vault as KMS or using
MINIO_SSE_MASTER_KEY),gateway will automatically perform
single encryption. If MINIO_GATEWAY_SSE is set up in addition to
Vault KMS, double encryption is performed.When neither KMS nor
MINIO_GATEWAY_SSE is set, do a pass through to backend.
When double encryption is specified, MINIO_GATEWAY_SSE can be set to
"C" for SSE-C encryption at gateway and backend, "S3" for SSE-S3
encryption at gateway/backend or both to support more than one option.
Fixes#6323, #6696
This PR introduces two new features
- AWS STS compatible STS API named AssumeRoleWithClientGrants
```
POST /?Action=AssumeRoleWithClientGrants&Token=<jwt>
```
This API endpoint returns temporary access credentials, access
tokens signature types supported by this API
- RSA keys
- ECDSA keys
Fetches the required public key from the JWKS endpoints, provides
them as rsa or ecdsa public keys.
- External policy engine support, in this case OPA policy engine
- Credentials are stored on disks
- Only require len(disks)/2 to initialize the cluster
- Fix checking of read/write quorm in subsystems init
- Add retry mechanism in policy and notification to avoid aborting in case of read/write quorums errors
Previously we used allow bucket policies without
`Version` field to be set to any given value, but
this behavior is inconsistent with AWS S3.
PR #5790 addressed this by making bucket policies
stricter and cleaner, but this causes a breaking
change causing any existing policies perhaps without
`Version` field or the field to be empty to fail upon
server startup.
This PR brings a code to migrate under these scenarios
as a one time operation.
- remove old bucket policy handling
- add new policy handling
- add new policy handling unit tests
This patch brings support to bucket policy to have more control not
limiting to anonymous. Bucket owner controls to allow/deny any rest
API.
For example server side encryption can be controlled by allowing
PUT/GET objects with encryptions including bucket owner.