```
mc admin config set alias/ storage_class standard=EC:3
```
should only succeed if parity ratio is valid for all
server pools, if not we should fail proactively.
This PR also needs to bring other changes now that
we need to cater for variadic drive counts per pool.
Bonus fixes also various bugs reproduced with
- GetObjectWithPartNumber()
- CopyObjectPartWithOffsets()
- CopyObjectWithMetadata()
- PutObjectPart,PutObject with truncated streams
Current implementation requires server pools to have
same erasure stripe sizes, to facilitate same SLA
and expectations.
This PR allows server pools to be variadic, i.e they
do not have to be same erasure stripe sizes - instead
they should have SLA for parity ratio.
If the parity ratio cannot be guaranteed by the new
server pool, the deployment is rejected i.e server
pool expansion is not allowed.
configurable remote transport timeouts for some special cases
where this value needs to be bumped to a higher value when
transferring large data between federated instances.
This commit refactors the certificate management implementation
in the `certs` package such that multiple certificates can be
specified at the same time. Therefore, the following layout of
the `certs/` directory is expected:
```
certs/
│
├─ public.crt
├─ private.key
├─ CAs/ // CAs directory is ignored
│ │
│ ...
│
├─ example.com/
│ │
│ ├─ public.crt
│ └─ private.key
└─ foobar.org/
│
├─ public.crt
└─ private.key
...
```
However, directory names like `example.com` are just for human
readability/organization and don't have any meaning w.r.t whether
a particular certificate is served or not. This decision is made based
on the SNI sent by the client and the SAN of the certificate.
***
The `Manager` will pick a certificate based on the client trying
to establish a TLS connection. In particular, it looks at the client
hello (i.e. SNI) to determine which host the client tries to access.
If the manager can find a certificate that matches the SNI it
returns this certificate to the client.
However, the client may choose to not send an SNI or tries to access
a server directly via IP (`https://<ip>:<port>`). In this case, we
cannot use the SNI to determine which certificate to serve. However,
we also should not pick "the first" certificate that would be accepted
by the client (based on crypto. parameters - like a signature algorithm)
because it may be an internal certificate that contains internal hostnames.
We would disclose internal infrastructure details doing so.
Therefore, the `Manager` returns the "default" certificate when the
client does not specify an SNI. The default certificate the top-level
`public.crt` - i.e. `certs/public.crt`.
This approach has some consequences:
- It's the operator's responsibility to ensure that the top-level
`public.crt` does not disclose any information (i.e. hostnames)
that are not publicly visible. However, this was the case in the
past already.
- Any other `public.crt` - except for the top-level one - must not
contain any IP SAN. The reason for this restriction is that the
Manager cannot match a SNI to an IP b/c the SNI is the server host
name. The entire purpose of SNI is to indicate which host the client
tries to connect to when multiple hosts run on the same IP. So, a
client will not set the SNI to an IP.
If we would allow IP SANs in a lower-level `public.crt` a user would
expect that it is possible to connect to MinIO directly via IP address
and that the MinIO server would pick "the right" certificate. However,
the MinIO server cannot determine which certificate to serve, and
therefore always picks the "default" one. This may lead to all sorts
of confusing errors like:
"It works if I use `https:instance.minio.local` but not when I use
`https://10.0.2.1`.
These consequences/limitations should be pointed out / explained in our
docs in an appropriate way. However, the support for multiple
certificates should not have any impact on how deployment with a single
certificate function today.
Co-authored-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@minio.io>
It is possible in situations when server was deployed
in asymmetric configuration in the past such as
```
minio server ~/fs{1...4}/disk{1...5}
```
Results in setDriveCount of 10 in older releases
but with fairly recent releases we have moved to
having server affinity which means that a set drive
count ascertained from above config will be now '4'
While the object layer make sure that we honor
`format.json` the storageClass configuration however
was by mistake was using the global value obtained
by heuristics. Which leads to prematurely using
lower parity without being requested by the an
administrator.
This PR fixes this behavior.
This PR has the following changes
- Removing duplicate lookupConfigs() calls.
- Deprecate admin config APIs for NAS gateways. This will avoid repeated reloads of the config from the disk.
- WatchConfigNASDisk will be removed
- Migration guide for NAS gateways users to migrate to ENV settings.
NOTE: THIS PR HAS A BREAKING CHANGE
Fixes#9875
Co-authored-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@minio.io>
- Implement a new xl.json 2.0.0 format to support,
this moves the entire marshaling logic to POSIX
layer, top layer always consumes a common FileInfo
construct which simplifies the metadata reads.
- Implement list object versions
- Migrate to siphash from crchash for new deployments
for object placements.
Fixes#2111
This PR adds a new configuration parameter which allows readiness
check to respond within 10secs, this can be reduced to a lower value
if necessary using
```
mc admin config set api ready_deadline=5s
```
or
```
export MINIO_API_READY_DEADLINE=5s
```
Add two new configuration entries, api.requests-max and
api.requests-deadline which have the same role of
MINIO_API_REQUESTS_MAX and MINIO_API_REQUESTS_DEADLINE.
- Add conservative timeouts upto 3 minutes
for internode communication
- Add aggressive timeouts of 30 seconds
for gateway communication
Fixes#9105Fixes#8732Fixes#8881Fixes#8376Fixes#9028
This is to ensure that when we have multiple tenants
deployed all sharing the same etcd for global bucket
should avoid listing each others buckets, this leads
to information leak which should be avoided unless
etcd is not namespaced for IAM assets in which case
it can be assumed that its a federated setup.
Federated setup and namespaced IAM assets on etcd
is not supported since namespacing is only useful
when you wish to separate the tenants as isolated
instances of MinIO.
This PR allows a new type of behavior, primarily
driven by the usecase of m3(mkube) multi-tenant
deployments with global bucket support.
This commit removes github.com/minio/kes as
a dependency and implements the necessary
client-side functionality without relying
on the KES project.
This resolves the licensing issue since
KES is licensed under AGPL while MinIO
is licensed under Apache.
The approach is that now safe mode is only invoked when
we cannot read the config or under some catastrophic
situations, but not under situations when config entries
are invalid or unreachable. This allows for maximum
availability for MinIO and not fail on our users unlike
most of our historical releases.
This commit adds support for the minio/kes KMS.
See: https://github.com/minio/kes
In particular you can configure it as KMS by:
- `export MINIO_KMS_KES_ENDPOINT=` // Server URL
- `export MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_FILE=` // TLS client private key
- `export MINIO_KMS_KES_CERT_FILE=` // TLS client certificate
- `export MINIO_KMS_KES_CA_PATH=` // Root CAs issuing server cert
- `export MINIO_KMS_KES_KEY_NAME=` // The name of the (default)
master key
Final update to all messages across sub-systems
after final review, the only change here is that
NATS now has TLS and TLSSkipVerify to be consistent
for all other notification targets.
Currently, we use the top-level prefix "config/"
for all our IAM assets, instead of to provide
tenant-level separation bring 'path_prefix'
to namespace the access properly.
Fixes#8567
- Migrate and save only settings which are enabled
- Rename logger_http to logger_webhook and
logger_http_audit to audit_webhook
- No more pretty printing comments, comment
is a key=value pair now.
- Avoid quotes on values which do not have space in them
- `state="on"` is implicit for all SetConfigKV unless
specified explicitly as `state="off"`
- Disabled IAM users should be disabled always
This PR refactors object layer handling such
that upon failure in sub-system initialization
server reaches a stage of safe-mode operation
wherein only certain API operations are enabled
and available.
This allows for fixing many scenarios such as
- incorrect configuration in vault, etcd,
notification targets
- missing files, incomplete config migrations
unable to read encrypted content etc
- any other issues related to notification,
policies, lifecycle etc