Configure http2 with higher maxconcurrent streams (#7363)

This value is needed for Minio's internode communication,
read the meaning of this value as per the HTTP 2.0 spec

https://http2.github.io/http2-spec/#rfc.section.5.1.2
master
Harshavardhana 6 years ago committed by kannappanr
parent a0ee7be050
commit 233824bf92
  1. 13
      cmd/http/server.go
  2. 4
      cmd/http/server_test.go
  3. 641
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/ciphers.go
  4. 28
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/client_conn_pool.go
  5. 80
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/configure_transport.go
  6. 13
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/errors.go
  7. 10
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/flow.go
  8. 71
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/frame.go
  9. 29
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go111.go
  10. 43
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go16.go
  11. 106
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go17.go
  12. 36
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go17_not18.go
  13. 54
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/go18.go
  14. 20
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/headermap.go
  15. 33
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/http2.go
  16. 20
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go111.go
  17. 46
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go16.go
  18. 87
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go17.go
  19. 27
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/not_go18.go
  20. 16
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/pipe.go
  21. 425
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/server.go
  22. 905
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/transport.go
  23. 15
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/write.go
  24. 2
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/http2/writesched_priority.go
  25. 351
      vendor/golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex/httplex.go
  26. 12
      vendor/vendor.json

@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ import (
"time"
humanize "github.com/dustin/go-humanize"
"golang.org/x/net/http2"
"github.com/minio/minio-go/pkg/set"
"github.com/minio/minio/pkg/certs"
)
@ -46,6 +48,9 @@ const (
// DefaultMaxHeaderBytes - default maximum HTTP header size in bytes.
DefaultMaxHeaderBytes = 1 * humanize.MiByte
// DefaultHTTP2MaxConcurrentStreams - default value for HTTP 2.0 maximum concurrent streams allowed.
DefaultHTTP2MaxConcurrentStreams = 1024
)
// Server - extended http.Server supports multiple addresses to serve and enhanced connection handling.
@ -56,7 +61,7 @@ type Server struct {
TCPKeepAliveTimeout time.Duration // timeout used for underneath TCP connection.
UpdateBytesReadFunc func(int) // function to be called to update bytes read in bufConn.
UpdateBytesWrittenFunc func(int) // function to be called to update bytes written in bufConn.
listenerMutex *sync.Mutex // to guard 'listener' field.
listenerMutex sync.Mutex // to guard 'listener' field.
listener *httpListener // HTTP listener for all 'Addrs' field.
inShutdown uint32 // indicates whether the server is in shutdown or not
requestCount int32 // counter holds no. of request in progress.
@ -120,6 +125,11 @@ func (srv *Server) Start() (err error) {
// Start servicing with listener.
if tlsConfig != nil {
if err = http2.ConfigureServer(&srv.Server, &http2.Server{
MaxConcurrentStreams: DefaultHTTP2MaxConcurrentStreams,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
return srv.Server.Serve(tls.NewListener(listener, tlsConfig))
}
return srv.Server.Serve(listener)
@ -202,7 +212,6 @@ func NewServer(addrs []string, handler http.Handler, getCert certs.GetCertificat
Addrs: addrs,
ShutdownTimeout: DefaultShutdownTimeout,
TCPKeepAliveTimeout: DefaultTCPKeepAliveTimeout,
listenerMutex: &sync.Mutex{},
}
httpServer.Handler = handler
httpServer.TLSConfig = tlsConfig

@ -77,10 +77,6 @@ func TestNewServer(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("Case %v: server.TCPKeepAliveTimeout: expected: %v, got: %v", (i + 1), DefaultTCPKeepAliveTimeout, server.TCPKeepAliveTimeout)
}
if server.listenerMutex == nil {
t.Fatalf("Case %v: server.listenerMutex: expected: <non-nil>, got: <nil>", (i + 1))
}
if server.ReadTimeout != DefaultReadTimeout {
t.Fatalf("Case %v: server.ReadTimeout: expected: %v, got: %v", (i + 1), DefaultReadTimeout, server.ReadTimeout)
}

@ -0,0 +1,641 @@
// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package http2
// A list of the possible cipher suite ids. Taken from
// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.txt
const (
cipher_TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL uint16 = 0x0000
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 uint16 = 0x0001
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0x0002
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x0003
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 uint16 = 0x0004
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x0006
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0007
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0008
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0009
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000A
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000B
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000C
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000D
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000E
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000F
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0010
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0011
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0012
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0013
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0014
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0015
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0016
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x0017
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 uint16 = 0x0018
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0019
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x001A
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x001B
// Reserved uint16 = 0x001C-1D
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x001E
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x001F
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0020
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0021
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5 uint16 = 0x0022
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5 uint16 = 0x0023
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 uint16 = 0x0024
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5 uint16 = 0x0025
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA uint16 = 0x0026
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA uint16 = 0x0027
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA uint16 = 0x0028
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x0029
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x002A
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 uint16 = 0x002B
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0x002C
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0x002D
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0x002E
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002F
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0030
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0031
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0032
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0033
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0034
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0036
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0037
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0038
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0039
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x003A
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003B
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003C
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003D
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003E
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x003F
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0040
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0041
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0042
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0043
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0044
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0045
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0046
// Reserved uint16 = 0x0047-4F
// Reserved uint16 = 0x0050-58
// Reserved uint16 = 0x0059-5C
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x005D-5F
// Reserved uint16 = 0x0060-66
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0067
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0068
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x0069
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006A
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006B
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006C
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x006D
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x006E-83
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0084
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0085
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0086
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0087
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0088
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0089
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x008A
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x008B
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x008C
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x008D
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x008E
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x008F
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0090
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0091
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0092
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0093
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0094
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0095
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0096
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0097
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0098
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0099
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x009A
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x009B
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009C
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009D
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x009E
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x009F
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A0
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A1
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A2
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A3
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A4
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A5
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A6
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A7
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00A8
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00A9
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00AA
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00AB
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00AC
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00AD
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00AE
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00AF
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B0
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B1
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B2
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B3
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B4
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B5
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B6
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B7
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00B8
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 uint16 = 0x00B9
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BA
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BB
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BC
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BD
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BE
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00BF
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C0
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C1
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C2
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C3
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C4
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0x00C5
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x00C6-FE
cipher_TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV uint16 = 0x00FF
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x01-55,*
cipher_TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
// Unassigned uint16 = 0x5601 - 0xC000
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC001
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC002
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC003
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC004
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC005
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC006
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC007
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC008
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC009
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC00A
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC00B
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC00C
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC00D
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC00E
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC00F
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC010
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC011
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC012
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC013
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC014
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC015
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC016
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC017
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC018
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC019
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01A
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01B
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01C
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01D
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01E
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC01F
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC020
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC021
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC022
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC023
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC024
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC025
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC026
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC027
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC028
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC029
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC02A
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC02B
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC02C
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC02D
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC02E
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC02F
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC030
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC031
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC032
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xC033
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC034
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC035
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xC036
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC037
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC038
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA uint16 = 0xC039
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC03A
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC03B
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC03C
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC03D
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC03E
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC03F
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC040
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC041
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC042
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC043
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC044
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC045
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC046
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC047
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC048
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC049
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC04A
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC04B
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC04C
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC04D
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC04E
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC04F
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC050
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC051
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC052
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC053
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC054
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC055
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC056
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC057
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC058
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC059
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC05A
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC05B
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC05C
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC05D
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC05E
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC05F
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC060
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC061
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC062
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC063
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC064
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC065
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC066
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC067
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC068
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC069
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC06A
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC06B
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC06C
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC06D
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC06E
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC06F
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC070
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC071
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC072
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC073
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC074
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC075
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC076
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC077
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC078
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC079
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC07A
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC07B
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC07C
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC07D
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC07E
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC07F
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC080
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC081
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC082
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC083
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC084
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC085
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC086
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC087
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC088
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC089
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC08A
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC08B
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC08C
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC08D
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC08E
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC08F
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC090
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC091
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC092
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC093
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC094
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC095
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC096
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC097
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC098
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC099
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 uint16 = 0xC09A
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 uint16 = 0xC09B
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC09C
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC09D
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC09E
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC09F
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A0
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A1
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A2
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A3
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC0A4
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC0A5
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC0A6
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC0A7
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A8
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0A9
cipher_TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0AA
cipher_TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0AB
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM uint16 = 0xC0AC
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM uint16 = 0xC0AD
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0AE
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 uint16 = 0xC0AF
// Unassigned uint16 = 0xC0B0-FF
// Unassigned uint16 = 0xC1-CB,*
// Unassigned uint16 = 0xCC00-A7
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCA8
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCA9
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAA
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAB
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAC
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAD
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 uint16 = 0xCCAE
)
// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
// References:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#appendix-A
// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
switch cipher {
case cipher_TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256,
cipher_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
cipher_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
cipher_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8:
return true
default:
return false
}
}

@ -52,9 +52,31 @@ const (
noDialOnMiss = false
)
// shouldTraceGetConn reports whether getClientConn should call any
// ClientTrace.GetConn hook associated with the http.Request.
//
// This complexity is needed to avoid double calls of the GetConn hook
// during the back-and-forth between net/http and x/net/http2 (when the
// net/http.Transport is upgraded to also speak http2), as well as support
// the case where x/net/http2 is being used directly.
func (p *clientConnPool) shouldTraceGetConn(st clientConnIdleState) bool {
// If our Transport wasn't made via ConfigureTransport, always
// trace the GetConn hook if provided, because that means the
// http2 package is being used directly and it's the one
// dialing, as opposed to net/http.
if _, ok := p.t.ConnPool.(noDialClientConnPool); !ok {
return true
}
// Otherwise, only use the GetConn hook if this connection has
// been used previously for other requests. For fresh
// connections, the net/http package does the dialing.
return !st.freshConn
}
func (p *clientConnPool) getClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string, dialOnMiss bool) (*ClientConn, error) {
if isConnectionCloseRequest(req) && dialOnMiss {
// It gets its own connection.
traceGetConn(req, addr)
const singleUse = true
cc, err := p.t.dialClientConn(addr, singleUse)
if err != nil {
@ -64,7 +86,10 @@ func (p *clientConnPool) getClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string, dialOnMis
}
p.mu.Lock()
for _, cc := range p.conns[addr] {
if cc.CanTakeNewRequest() {
if st := cc.idleState(); st.canTakeNewRequest {
if p.shouldTraceGetConn(st) {
traceGetConn(req, addr)
}
p.mu.Unlock()
return cc, nil
}
@ -73,6 +98,7 @@ func (p *clientConnPool) getClientConn(req *http.Request, addr string, dialOnMis
p.mu.Unlock()
return nil, ErrNoCachedConn
}
traceGetConn(req, addr)
call := p.getStartDialLocked(addr)
p.mu.Unlock()
<-call.done

@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.6
package http2
import (
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"net/http"
)
func configureTransport(t1 *http.Transport) (*Transport, error) {
connPool := new(clientConnPool)
t2 := &Transport{
ConnPool: noDialClientConnPool{connPool},
t1: t1,
}
connPool.t = t2
if err := registerHTTPSProtocol(t1, noDialH2RoundTripper{t2}); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if t1.TLSClientConfig == nil {
t1.TLSClientConfig = new(tls.Config)
}
if !strSliceContains(t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos, "h2") {
t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos = append([]string{"h2"}, t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos...)
}
if !strSliceContains(t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos, "http/1.1") {
t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos = append(t1.TLSClientConfig.NextProtos, "http/1.1")
}
upgradeFn := func(authority string, c *tls.Conn) http.RoundTripper {
addr := authorityAddr("https", authority)
if used, err := connPool.addConnIfNeeded(addr, t2, c); err != nil {
go c.Close()
return erringRoundTripper{err}
} else if !used {
// Turns out we don't need this c.
// For example, two goroutines made requests to the same host
// at the same time, both kicking off TCP dials. (since protocol
// was unknown)
go c.Close()
}
return t2
}
if m := t1.TLSNextProto; len(m) == 0 {
t1.TLSNextProto = map[string]func(string, *tls.Conn) http.RoundTripper{
"h2": upgradeFn,
}
} else {
m["h2"] = upgradeFn
}
return t2, nil
}
// registerHTTPSProtocol calls Transport.RegisterProtocol but
// convering panics into errors.
func registerHTTPSProtocol(t *http.Transport, rt http.RoundTripper) (err error) {
defer func() {
if e := recover(); e != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("%v", e)
}
}()
t.RegisterProtocol("https", rt)
return nil
}
// noDialH2RoundTripper is a RoundTripper which only tries to complete the request
// if there's already has a cached connection to the host.
type noDialH2RoundTripper struct{ t *Transport }
func (rt noDialH2RoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
res, err := rt.t.RoundTrip(req)
if err == ErrNoCachedConn {
return nil, http.ErrSkipAltProtocol
}
return res, err
}

@ -87,13 +87,16 @@ type goAwayFlowError struct{}
func (goAwayFlowError) Error() string { return "connection exceeded flow control window size" }
// connErrorReason wraps a ConnectionError with an informative error about why it occurs.
// connError represents an HTTP/2 ConnectionError error code, along
// with a string (for debugging) explaining why.
//
// Errors of this type are only returned by the frame parser functions
// and converted into ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol).
// and converted into ConnectionError(Code), after stashing away
// the Reason into the Framer's errDetail field, accessible via
// the (*Framer).ErrorDetail method.
type connError struct {
Code ErrCode
Reason string
Code ErrCode // the ConnectionError error code
Reason string // additional reason
}
func (e connError) Error() string {

@ -41,10 +41,10 @@ func (f *flow) take(n int32) {
// add adds n bytes (positive or negative) to the flow control window.
// It returns false if the sum would exceed 2^31-1.
func (f *flow) add(n int32) bool {
remain := (1<<31 - 1) - f.n
if n > remain {
return false
sum := f.n + n
if (sum > n) == (f.n > 0) {
f.n = sum
return true
}
f.n += n
return true
return false
}

@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import (
"strings"
"sync"
"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
"golang.org/x/net/http2/hpack"
"golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex"
)
const frameHeaderLen = 9
@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ func (f *Framer) WriteData(streamID uint32, endStream bool, data []byte) error {
return f.WriteDataPadded(streamID, endStream, data, nil)
}
// WriteData writes a DATA frame with optional padding.
// WriteDataPadded writes a DATA frame with optional padding.
//
// If pad is nil, the padding bit is not sent.
// The length of pad must not exceed 255 bytes.
@ -733,32 +733,67 @@ func (f *SettingsFrame) IsAck() bool {
return f.FrameHeader.Flags.Has(FlagSettingsAck)
}
func (f *SettingsFrame) Value(s SettingID) (v uint32, ok bool) {
func (f *SettingsFrame) Value(id SettingID) (v uint32, ok bool) {
f.checkValid()
buf := f.p
for len(buf) > 0 {
settingID := SettingID(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[:2]))
if settingID == s {
return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[2:6]), true
for i := 0; i < f.NumSettings(); i++ {
if s := f.Setting(i); s.ID == id {
return s.Val, true
}
buf = buf[6:]
}
return 0, false
}
// Setting returns the setting from the frame at the given 0-based index.
// The index must be >= 0 and less than f.NumSettings().
func (f *SettingsFrame) Setting(i int) Setting {
buf := f.p
return Setting{
ID: SettingID(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[i*6 : i*6+2])),
Val: binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[i*6+2 : i*6+6]),
}
}
func (f *SettingsFrame) NumSettings() int { return len(f.p) / 6 }
// HasDuplicates reports whether f contains any duplicate setting IDs.
func (f *SettingsFrame) HasDuplicates() bool {
num := f.NumSettings()
if num == 0 {
return false
}
// If it's small enough (the common case), just do the n^2
// thing and avoid a map allocation.
if num < 10 {
for i := 0; i < num; i++ {
idi := f.Setting(i).ID
for j := i + 1; j < num; j++ {
idj := f.Setting(j).ID
if idi == idj {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
seen := map[SettingID]bool{}
for i := 0; i < num; i++ {
id := f.Setting(i).ID
if seen[id] {
return true
}
seen[id] = true
}
return false
}
// ForeachSetting runs fn for each setting.
// It stops and returns the first error.
func (f *SettingsFrame) ForeachSetting(fn func(Setting) error) error {
f.checkValid()
buf := f.p
for len(buf) > 0 {
if err := fn(Setting{
SettingID(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[:2])),
binary.BigEndian.Uint32(buf[2:6]),
}); err != nil {
for i := 0; i < f.NumSettings(); i++ {
if err := fn(f.Setting(i)); err != nil {
return err
}
buf = buf[6:]
}
return nil
}
@ -1442,7 +1477,7 @@ func (fr *Framer) maxHeaderStringLen() int {
}
// readMetaFrame returns 0 or more CONTINUATION frames from fr and
// merge them into into the provided hf and returns a MetaHeadersFrame
// merge them into the provided hf and returns a MetaHeadersFrame
// with the decoded hpack values.
func (fr *Framer) readMetaFrame(hf *HeadersFrame) (*MetaHeadersFrame, error) {
if fr.AllowIllegalReads {
@ -1462,7 +1497,7 @@ func (fr *Framer) readMetaFrame(hf *HeadersFrame) (*MetaHeadersFrame, error) {
if VerboseLogs && fr.logReads {
fr.debugReadLoggerf("http2: decoded hpack field %+v", hf)
}
if !httplex.ValidHeaderFieldValue(hf.Value) {
if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(hf.Value) {
invalid = headerFieldValueError(hf.Value)
}
isPseudo := strings.HasPrefix(hf.Name, ":")

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.11
package http2
import (
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/textproto"
)
func traceHasWroteHeaderField(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace) bool {
return trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaderField != nil
}
func traceWroteHeaderField(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace, k, v string) {
if trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaderField != nil {
trace.WroteHeaderField(k, []string{v})
}
}
func traceGot1xxResponseFunc(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace) func(int, textproto.MIMEHeader) error {
if trace != nil {
return trace.Got1xxResponse
}
return nil
}

@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.6
package http2
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net/http"
"time"
)
func transportExpectContinueTimeout(t1 *http.Transport) time.Duration {
return t1.ExpectContinueTimeout
}
// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
switch cipher {
case tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
return true
default:
return false
}
}

@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.7
package http2
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptrace"
"time"
)
type contextContext interface {
context.Context
}
func serverConnBaseContext(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) (ctx contextContext, cancel func()) {
ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.LocalAddrContextKey, c.LocalAddr())
if hs := opts.baseConfig(); hs != nil {
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.ServerContextKey, hs)
}
return
}
func contextWithCancel(ctx contextContext) (_ contextContext, cancel func()) {
return context.WithCancel(ctx)
}
func requestWithContext(req *http.Request, ctx contextContext) *http.Request {
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
type clientTrace httptrace.ClientTrace
func reqContext(r *http.Request) context.Context { return r.Context() }
func (t *Transport) idleConnTimeout() time.Duration {
if t.t1 != nil {
return t.t1.IdleConnTimeout
}
return 0
}
func setResponseUncompressed(res *http.Response) { res.Uncompressed = true }
func traceGotConn(req *http.Request, cc *ClientConn) {
trace := httptrace.ContextClientTrace(req.Context())
if trace == nil || trace.GotConn == nil {
return
}
ci := httptrace.GotConnInfo{Conn: cc.tconn}
cc.mu.Lock()
ci.Reused = cc.nextStreamID > 1
ci.WasIdle = len(cc.streams) == 0 && ci.Reused
if ci.WasIdle && !cc.lastActive.IsZero() {
ci.IdleTime = time.Now().Sub(cc.lastActive)
}
cc.mu.Unlock()
trace.GotConn(ci)
}
func traceWroteHeaders(trace *clientTrace) {
if trace != nil && trace.WroteHeaders != nil {
trace.WroteHeaders()
}
}
func traceGot100Continue(trace *clientTrace) {
if trace != nil && trace.Got100Continue != nil {
trace.Got100Continue()
}
}
func traceWait100Continue(trace *clientTrace) {
if trace != nil && trace.Wait100Continue != nil {
trace.Wait100Continue()
}
}
func traceWroteRequest(trace *clientTrace, err error) {
if trace != nil && trace.WroteRequest != nil {
trace.WroteRequest(httptrace.WroteRequestInfo{Err: err})
}
}
func traceFirstResponseByte(trace *clientTrace) {
if trace != nil && trace.GotFirstResponseByte != nil {
trace.GotFirstResponseByte()
}
}
func requestTrace(req *http.Request) *clientTrace {
trace := httptrace.ContextClientTrace(req.Context())
return (*clientTrace)(trace)
}
// Ping sends a PING frame to the server and waits for the ack.
func (cc *ClientConn) Ping(ctx context.Context) error {
return cc.ping(ctx)
}

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.7,!go1.8
package http2
import "crypto/tls"
// temporary copy of Go 1.7's private tls.Config.clone:
func cloneTLSConfig(c *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
return &tls.Config{
Rand: c.Rand,
Time: c.Time,
Certificates: c.Certificates,
NameToCertificate: c.NameToCertificate,
GetCertificate: c.GetCertificate,
RootCAs: c.RootCAs,
NextProtos: c.NextProtos,
ServerName: c.ServerName,
ClientAuth: c.ClientAuth,
ClientCAs: c.ClientCAs,
InsecureSkipVerify: c.InsecureSkipVerify,
CipherSuites: c.CipherSuites,
PreferServerCipherSuites: c.PreferServerCipherSuites,
SessionTicketsDisabled: c.SessionTicketsDisabled,
SessionTicketKey: c.SessionTicketKey,
ClientSessionCache: c.ClientSessionCache,
MinVersion: c.MinVersion,
MaxVersion: c.MaxVersion,
CurvePreferences: c.CurvePreferences,
DynamicRecordSizingDisabled: c.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled,
Renegotiation: c.Renegotiation,
}
}

@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build go1.8
package http2
import (
"crypto/tls"
"io"
"net/http"
)
func cloneTLSConfig(c *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
c2 := c.Clone()
c2.GetClientCertificate = c.GetClientCertificate // golang.org/issue/19264
return c2
}
var _ http.Pusher = (*responseWriter)(nil)
// Push implements http.Pusher.
func (w *responseWriter) Push(target string, opts *http.PushOptions) error {
internalOpts := pushOptions{}
if opts != nil {
internalOpts.Method = opts.Method
internalOpts.Header = opts.Header
}
return w.push(target, internalOpts)
}
func configureServer18(h1 *http.Server, h2 *Server) error {
if h2.IdleTimeout == 0 {
if h1.IdleTimeout != 0 {
h2.IdleTimeout = h1.IdleTimeout
} else {
h2.IdleTimeout = h1.ReadTimeout
}
}
return nil
}
func shouldLogPanic(panicValue interface{}) bool {
return panicValue != nil && panicValue != http.ErrAbortHandler
}
func reqGetBody(req *http.Request) func() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
return req.GetBody
}
func reqBodyIsNoBody(body io.ReadCloser) bool {
return body == http.NoBody
}

@ -7,15 +7,21 @@ package http2
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
)
var (
commonLowerHeader = map[string]string{} // Go-Canonical-Case -> lower-case
commonCanonHeader = map[string]string{} // lower-case -> Go-Canonical-Case
commonBuildOnce sync.Once
commonLowerHeader map[string]string // Go-Canonical-Case -> lower-case
commonCanonHeader map[string]string // lower-case -> Go-Canonical-Case
)
func init() {
for _, v := range []string{
func buildCommonHeaderMapsOnce() {
commonBuildOnce.Do(buildCommonHeaderMaps)
}
func buildCommonHeaderMaps() {
common := []string{
"accept",
"accept-charset",
"accept-encoding",
@ -63,7 +69,10 @@ func init() {
"vary",
"via",
"www-authenticate",
} {
}
commonLowerHeader = make(map[string]string, len(common))
commonCanonHeader = make(map[string]string, len(common))
for _, v := range common {
chk := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(v)
commonLowerHeader[chk] = v
commonCanonHeader[v] = chk
@ -71,6 +80,7 @@ func init() {
}
func lowerHeader(v string) string {
buildCommonHeaderMapsOnce()
if s, ok := commonLowerHeader[v]; ok {
return s
}

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"sync"
"golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex"
"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
)
var (
@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ var (
)
// validWireHeaderFieldName reports whether v is a valid header field
// name (key). See httplex.ValidHeaderName for the base rules.
// name (key). See httpguts.ValidHeaderName for the base rules.
//
// Further, http2 says:
// "Just as in HTTP/1.x, header field names are strings of ASCII
@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ func validWireHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
return false
}
for _, r := range v {
if !httplex.IsTokenRune(r) {
if !httpguts.IsTokenRune(r) {
return false
}
if 'A' <= r && r <= 'Z' {
@ -201,19 +201,12 @@ func validWireHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
return true
}
var httpCodeStringCommon = map[int]string{} // n -> strconv.Itoa(n)
func init() {
for i := 100; i <= 999; i++ {
if v := http.StatusText(i); v != "" {
httpCodeStringCommon[i] = strconv.Itoa(i)
}
}
}
func httpCodeString(code int) string {
if s, ok := httpCodeStringCommon[code]; ok {
return s
switch code {
case 200:
return "200"
case 404:
return "404"
}
return strconv.Itoa(code)
}
@ -312,7 +305,7 @@ func mustUint31(v int32) uint32 {
}
// bodyAllowedForStatus reports whether a given response status code
// permits a body. See RFC 2616, section 4.4.
// permits a body. See RFC 7230, section 3.3.
func bodyAllowedForStatus(status int) bool {
switch {
case status >= 100 && status <= 199:
@ -376,12 +369,16 @@ func (s *sorter) SortStrings(ss []string) {
// validPseudoPath reports whether v is a valid :path pseudo-header
// value. It must be either:
//
// *) a non-empty string starting with '/', but not with with "//",
// *) a non-empty string starting with '/'
// *) the string '*', for OPTIONS requests.
//
// For now this is only used a quick check for deciding when to clean
// up Opaque URLs before sending requests from the Transport.
// See golang.org/issue/16847
//
// We used to enforce that the path also didn't start with "//", but
// Google's GFE accepts such paths and Chrome sends them, so ignore
// that part of the spec. See golang.org/issue/19103.
func validPseudoPath(v string) bool {
return (len(v) > 0 && v[0] == '/' && (len(v) == 1 || v[1] != '/')) || v == "*"
return (len(v) > 0 && v[0] == '/') || v == "*"
}

@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !go1.11
package http2
import (
"net/http/httptrace"
"net/textproto"
)
func traceHasWroteHeaderField(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace) bool { return false }
func traceWroteHeaderField(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace, k, v string) {}
func traceGot1xxResponseFunc(trace *httptrace.ClientTrace) func(int, textproto.MIMEHeader) error {
return nil
}

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !go1.6
package http2
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net/http"
"time"
)
func configureTransport(t1 *http.Transport) (*Transport, error) {
return nil, errTransportVersion
}
func transportExpectContinueTimeout(t1 *http.Transport) time.Duration {
return 0
}
// isBadCipher reports whether the cipher is blacklisted by the HTTP/2 spec.
func isBadCipher(cipher uint16) bool {
switch cipher {
case tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
// Reject cipher suites from Appendix A.
// "This list includes those cipher suites that do not
// offer an ephemeral key exchange and those that are
// based on the TLS null, stream or block cipher type"
return true
default:
return false
}
}

@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !go1.7
package http2
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net"
"net/http"
"time"
)
type contextContext interface {
Done() <-chan struct{}
Err() error
}
type fakeContext struct{}
func (fakeContext) Done() <-chan struct{} { return nil }
func (fakeContext) Err() error { panic("should not be called") }
func reqContext(r *http.Request) fakeContext {
return fakeContext{}
}
func setResponseUncompressed(res *http.Response) {
// Nothing.
}
type clientTrace struct{}
func requestTrace(*http.Request) *clientTrace { return nil }
func traceGotConn(*http.Request, *ClientConn) {}
func traceFirstResponseByte(*clientTrace) {}
func traceWroteHeaders(*clientTrace) {}
func traceWroteRequest(*clientTrace, error) {}
func traceGot100Continue(trace *clientTrace) {}
func traceWait100Continue(trace *clientTrace) {}
func nop() {}
func serverConnBaseContext(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) (ctx contextContext, cancel func()) {
return nil, nop
}
func contextWithCancel(ctx contextContext) (_ contextContext, cancel func()) {
return ctx, nop
}
func requestWithContext(req *http.Request, ctx contextContext) *http.Request {
return req
}
// temporary copy of Go 1.6's private tls.Config.clone:
func cloneTLSConfig(c *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
return &tls.Config{
Rand: c.Rand,
Time: c.Time,
Certificates: c.Certificates,
NameToCertificate: c.NameToCertificate,
GetCertificate: c.GetCertificate,
RootCAs: c.RootCAs,
NextProtos: c.NextProtos,
ServerName: c.ServerName,
ClientAuth: c.ClientAuth,
ClientCAs: c.ClientCAs,
InsecureSkipVerify: c.InsecureSkipVerify,
CipherSuites: c.CipherSuites,
PreferServerCipherSuites: c.PreferServerCipherSuites,
SessionTicketsDisabled: c.SessionTicketsDisabled,
SessionTicketKey: c.SessionTicketKey,
ClientSessionCache: c.ClientSessionCache,
MinVersion: c.MinVersion,
MaxVersion: c.MaxVersion,
CurvePreferences: c.CurvePreferences,
}
}
func (cc *ClientConn) Ping(ctx contextContext) error {
return cc.ping(ctx)
}
func (t *Transport) idleConnTimeout() time.Duration { return 0 }

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !go1.8
package http2
import (
"io"
"net/http"
)
func configureServer18(h1 *http.Server, h2 *Server) error {
// No IdleTimeout to sync prior to Go 1.8.
return nil
}
func shouldLogPanic(panicValue interface{}) bool {
return panicValue != nil
}
func reqGetBody(req *http.Request) func() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
return nil
}
func reqBodyIsNoBody(io.ReadCloser) bool { return false }

@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ import (
// underlying buffer is an interface. (io.Pipe is always unbuffered)
type pipe struct {
mu sync.Mutex
c sync.Cond // c.L lazily initialized to &p.mu
b pipeBuffer
c sync.Cond // c.L lazily initialized to &p.mu
b pipeBuffer // nil when done reading
err error // read error once empty. non-nil means closed.
breakErr error // immediate read error (caller doesn't see rest of b)
donec chan struct{} // closed on error
@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ type pipeBuffer interface {
func (p *pipe) Len() int {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if p.b == nil {
return 0
}
return p.b.Len()
}
@ -47,7 +50,7 @@ func (p *pipe) Read(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
if p.breakErr != nil {
return 0, p.breakErr
}
if p.b.Len() > 0 {
if p.b != nil && p.b.Len() > 0 {
return p.b.Read(d)
}
if p.err != nil {
@ -55,6 +58,7 @@ func (p *pipe) Read(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
p.readFn() // e.g. copy trailers
p.readFn = nil // not sticky like p.err
}
p.b = nil
return 0, p.err
}
p.c.Wait()
@ -75,6 +79,9 @@ func (p *pipe) Write(d []byte) (n int, err error) {
if p.err != nil {
return 0, errClosedPipeWrite
}
if p.breakErr != nil {
return len(d), nil // discard when there is no reader
}
return p.b.Write(d)
}
@ -109,6 +116,9 @@ func (p *pipe) closeWithError(dst *error, err error, fn func()) {
return
}
p.readFn = fn
if dst == &p.breakErr {
p.b = nil
}
*dst = err
p.closeDoneLocked()
}

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ package http2
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"fmt"
@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ import (
"sync"
"time"
"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
"golang.org/x/net/http2/hpack"
)
@ -126,6 +128,11 @@ type Server struct {
// NewWriteScheduler constructs a write scheduler for a connection.
// If nil, a default scheduler is chosen.
NewWriteScheduler func() WriteScheduler
// Internal state. This is a pointer (rather than embedded directly)
// so that we don't embed a Mutex in this struct, which will make the
// struct non-copyable, which might break some callers.
state *serverInternalState
}
func (s *Server) initialConnRecvWindowSize() int32 {
@ -156,6 +163,40 @@ func (s *Server) maxConcurrentStreams() uint32 {
return defaultMaxStreams
}
type serverInternalState struct {
mu sync.Mutex
activeConns map[*serverConn]struct{}
}
func (s *serverInternalState) registerConn(sc *serverConn) {
if s == nil {
return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.activeConns[sc] = struct{}{}
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *serverInternalState) unregisterConn(sc *serverConn) {
if s == nil {
return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
}
s.mu.Lock()
delete(s.activeConns, sc)
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *serverInternalState) startGracefulShutdown() {
if s == nil {
return // if the Server was used without calling ConfigureServer
}
s.mu.Lock()
for sc := range s.activeConns {
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
}
s.mu.Unlock()
}
// ConfigureServer adds HTTP/2 support to a net/http Server.
//
// The configuration conf may be nil.
@ -168,21 +209,30 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
if conf == nil {
conf = new(Server)
}
if err := configureServer18(s, conf); err != nil {
return err
conf.state = &serverInternalState{activeConns: make(map[*serverConn]struct{})}
if h1, h2 := s, conf; h2.IdleTimeout == 0 {
if h1.IdleTimeout != 0 {
h2.IdleTimeout = h1.IdleTimeout
} else {
h2.IdleTimeout = h1.ReadTimeout
}
}
s.RegisterOnShutdown(conf.state.startGracefulShutdown)
if s.TLSConfig == nil {
s.TLSConfig = new(tls.Config)
} else if s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites != nil {
// If they already provided a CipherSuite list, return
// an error if it has a bad order or is missing
// ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
const requiredCipher = tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
// ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 or ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
haveRequired := false
sawBad := false
for i, cs := range s.TLSConfig.CipherSuites {
if cs == requiredCipher {
switch cs {
case tls.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
// Alternative MTI cipher to not discourage ECDSA-only servers.
// See http://golang.org/cl/30721 for further information.
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
haveRequired = true
}
if isBadCipher(cs) {
@ -192,7 +242,7 @@ func ConfigureServer(s *http.Server, conf *Server) error {
}
}
if !haveRequired {
return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites is missing HTTP/2-required TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256")
return fmt.Errorf("http2: TLSConfig.CipherSuites is missing an HTTP/2-required AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher.")
}
}
@ -292,7 +342,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
streams: make(map[uint32]*stream),
readFrameCh: make(chan readFrameResult),
wantWriteFrameCh: make(chan FrameWriteRequest, 8),
wantStartPushCh: make(chan startPushRequest, 8),
serveMsgCh: make(chan interface{}, 8),
wroteFrameCh: make(chan frameWriteResult, 1), // buffered; one send in writeFrameAsync
bodyReadCh: make(chan bodyReadMsg), // buffering doesn't matter either way
doneServing: make(chan struct{}),
@ -305,6 +355,9 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
pushEnabled: true,
}
s.state.registerConn(sc)
defer s.state.unregisterConn(sc)
// The net/http package sets the write deadline from the
// http.Server.WriteTimeout during the TLS handshake, but then
// passes the connection off to us with the deadline already set.
@ -357,7 +410,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
// addresses during development.
//
// TODO: optionally enforce? Or enforce at the time we receive
// a new request, and verify the the ServerName matches the :authority?
// a new request, and verify the ServerName matches the :authority?
// But that precludes proxy situations, perhaps.
//
// So for now, do nothing here again.
@ -385,6 +438,15 @@ func (s *Server) ServeConn(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) {
sc.serve()
}
func serverConnBaseContext(c net.Conn, opts *ServeConnOpts) (ctx context.Context, cancel func()) {
ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.LocalAddrContextKey, c.LocalAddr())
if hs := opts.baseConfig(); hs != nil {
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, http.ServerContextKey, hs)
}
return
}
func (sc *serverConn) rejectConn(err ErrCode, debug string) {
sc.vlogf("http2: server rejecting conn: %v, %s", err, debug)
// ignoring errors. hanging up anyway.
@ -400,15 +462,14 @@ type serverConn struct {
conn net.Conn
bw *bufferedWriter // writing to conn
handler http.Handler
baseCtx contextContext
baseCtx context.Context
framer *Framer
doneServing chan struct{} // closed when serverConn.serve ends
readFrameCh chan readFrameResult // written by serverConn.readFrames
wantWriteFrameCh chan FrameWriteRequest // from handlers -> serve
wantStartPushCh chan startPushRequest // from handlers -> serve
wroteFrameCh chan frameWriteResult // from writeFrameAsync -> serve, tickles more frame writes
bodyReadCh chan bodyReadMsg // from handlers -> serve
testHookCh chan func(int) // code to run on the serve loop
serveMsgCh chan interface{} // misc messages & code to send to / run on the serve loop
flow flow // conn-wide (not stream-specific) outbound flow control
inflow flow // conn-wide inbound flow control
tlsState *tls.ConnectionState // shared by all handlers, like net/http
@ -440,14 +501,15 @@ type serverConn struct {
inFrameScheduleLoop bool // whether we're in the scheduleFrameWrite loop
needToSendGoAway bool // we need to schedule a GOAWAY frame write
goAwayCode ErrCode
shutdownTimerCh <-chan time.Time // nil until used
shutdownTimer *time.Timer // nil until used
idleTimer *time.Timer // nil if unused
idleTimerCh <-chan time.Time // nil if unused
shutdownTimer *time.Timer // nil until used
idleTimer *time.Timer // nil if unused
// Owned by the writeFrameAsync goroutine:
headerWriteBuf bytes.Buffer
hpackEncoder *hpack.Encoder
// Used by startGracefulShutdown.
shutdownOnce sync.Once
}
func (sc *serverConn) maxHeaderListSize() uint32 {
@ -480,7 +542,7 @@ type stream struct {
id uint32
body *pipe // non-nil if expecting DATA frames
cw closeWaiter // closed wait stream transitions to closed state
ctx contextContext
ctx context.Context
cancelCtx func()
// owned by serverConn's serve loop:
@ -603,7 +665,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) condlogf(err error, format string, args ...interface{}) {
if err == nil {
return
}
if err == io.EOF || err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF || isClosedConnError(err) {
if err == io.EOF || err == io.ErrUnexpectedEOF || isClosedConnError(err) || err == errPrefaceTimeout {
// Boring, expected errors.
sc.vlogf(format, args...)
} else {
@ -613,6 +675,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) condlogf(err error, format string, args ...interface{}) {
func (sc *serverConn) canonicalHeader(v string) string {
sc.serveG.check()
buildCommonHeaderMapsOnce()
cv, ok := commonCanonHeader[v]
if ok {
return cv
@ -748,19 +811,15 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
sc.setConnState(http.StateIdle)
if sc.srv.IdleTimeout != 0 {
sc.idleTimer = time.NewTimer(sc.srv.IdleTimeout)
sc.idleTimer = time.AfterFunc(sc.srv.IdleTimeout, sc.onIdleTimer)
defer sc.idleTimer.Stop()
sc.idleTimerCh = sc.idleTimer.C
}
var gracefulShutdownCh <-chan struct{}
if sc.hs != nil {
gracefulShutdownCh = h1ServerShutdownChan(sc.hs)
}
go sc.readFrames() // closed by defer sc.conn.Close above
settingsTimer := time.NewTimer(firstSettingsTimeout)
settingsTimer := time.AfterFunc(firstSettingsTimeout, sc.onSettingsTimer)
defer settingsTimer.Stop()
loopNum := 0
for {
loopNum++
@ -771,8 +830,6 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
break
}
sc.writeFrame(wr)
case spr := <-sc.wantStartPushCh:
sc.startPush(spr)
case res := <-sc.wroteFrameCh:
sc.wroteFrame(res)
case res := <-sc.readFrameCh:
@ -780,36 +837,85 @@ func (sc *serverConn) serve() {
return
}
res.readMore()
if settingsTimer.C != nil {
if settingsTimer != nil {
settingsTimer.Stop()
settingsTimer.C = nil
settingsTimer = nil
}
case m := <-sc.bodyReadCh:
sc.noteBodyRead(m.st, m.n)
case <-settingsTimer.C:
sc.logf("timeout waiting for SETTINGS frames from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
return
case <-gracefulShutdownCh:
gracefulShutdownCh = nil
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
case <-sc.shutdownTimerCh:
sc.vlogf("GOAWAY close timer fired; closing conn from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
return
case <-sc.idleTimerCh:
sc.vlogf("connection is idle")
sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
case fn := <-sc.testHookCh:
fn(loopNum)
case msg := <-sc.serveMsgCh:
switch v := msg.(type) {
case func(int):
v(loopNum) // for testing
case *serverMessage:
switch v {
case settingsTimerMsg:
sc.logf("timeout waiting for SETTINGS frames from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
return
case idleTimerMsg:
sc.vlogf("connection is idle")
sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
case shutdownTimerMsg:
sc.vlogf("GOAWAY close timer fired; closing conn from %v", sc.conn.RemoteAddr())
return
case gracefulShutdownMsg:
sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
default:
panic("unknown timer")
}
case *startPushRequest:
sc.startPush(v)
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unexpected type %T", v))
}
}
if sc.inGoAway && sc.curOpenStreams() == 0 && !sc.needToSendGoAway && !sc.writingFrame {
return
// Start the shutdown timer after sending a GOAWAY. When sending GOAWAY
// with no error code (graceful shutdown), don't start the timer until
// all open streams have been completed.
sentGoAway := sc.inGoAway && !sc.needToSendGoAway && !sc.writingFrame
gracefulShutdownComplete := sc.goAwayCode == ErrCodeNo && sc.curOpenStreams() == 0
if sentGoAway && sc.shutdownTimer == nil && (sc.goAwayCode != ErrCodeNo || gracefulShutdownComplete) {
sc.shutDownIn(goAwayTimeout)
}
}
}
// readPreface reads the ClientPreface greeting from the peer
// or returns an error on timeout or an invalid greeting.
func (sc *serverConn) awaitGracefulShutdown(sharedCh <-chan struct{}, privateCh chan struct{}) {
select {
case <-sc.doneServing:
case <-sharedCh:
close(privateCh)
}
}
type serverMessage int
// Message values sent to serveMsgCh.
var (
settingsTimerMsg = new(serverMessage)
idleTimerMsg = new(serverMessage)
shutdownTimerMsg = new(serverMessage)
gracefulShutdownMsg = new(serverMessage)
)
func (sc *serverConn) onSettingsTimer() { sc.sendServeMsg(settingsTimerMsg) }
func (sc *serverConn) onIdleTimer() { sc.sendServeMsg(idleTimerMsg) }
func (sc *serverConn) onShutdownTimer() { sc.sendServeMsg(shutdownTimerMsg) }
func (sc *serverConn) sendServeMsg(msg interface{}) {
sc.serveG.checkNotOn() // NOT
select {
case sc.serveMsgCh <- msg:
case <-sc.doneServing:
}
}
var errPrefaceTimeout = errors.New("timeout waiting for client preface")
// readPreface reads the ClientPreface greeting from the peer or
// returns errPrefaceTimeout on timeout, or an error if the greeting
// is invalid.
func (sc *serverConn) readPreface() error {
errc := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
@ -827,7 +933,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) readPreface() error {
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case <-timer.C:
return errors.New("timeout waiting for client preface")
return errPrefaceTimeout
case err := <-errc:
if err == nil {
if VerboseLogs {
@ -1016,7 +1122,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) startFrameWrite(wr FrameWriteRequest) {
// errHandlerPanicked is the error given to any callers blocked in a read from
// Request.Body when the main goroutine panics. Since most handlers read in the
// the main ServeHTTP goroutine, this will show up rarely.
// main ServeHTTP goroutine, this will show up rarely.
var errHandlerPanicked = errors.New("http2: handler panicked")
// wroteFrame is called on the serve goroutine with the result of
@ -1125,33 +1231,43 @@ func (sc *serverConn) scheduleFrameWrite() {
sc.inFrameScheduleLoop = false
}
// startGracefulShutdown sends a GOAWAY with ErrCodeNo to tell the
// client we're gracefully shutting down. The connection isn't closed
// until all current streams are done.
// startGracefulShutdown gracefully shuts down a connection. This
// sends GOAWAY with ErrCodeNo to tell the client we're gracefully
// shutting down. The connection isn't closed until all current
// streams are done.
//
// startGracefulShutdown returns immediately; it does not wait until
// the connection has shut down.
func (sc *serverConn) startGracefulShutdown() {
sc.goAwayIn(ErrCodeNo, 0)
sc.serveG.checkNotOn() // NOT
sc.shutdownOnce.Do(func() { sc.sendServeMsg(gracefulShutdownMsg) })
}
func (sc *serverConn) goAway(code ErrCode) {
sc.serveG.check()
var forceCloseIn time.Duration
if code != ErrCodeNo {
forceCloseIn = 250 * time.Millisecond
} else {
// TODO: configurable
forceCloseIn = 1 * time.Second
}
sc.goAwayIn(code, forceCloseIn)
// After sending GOAWAY, the connection will close after goAwayTimeout.
// If we close the connection immediately after sending GOAWAY, there may
// be unsent data in our kernel receive buffer, which will cause the kernel
// to send a TCP RST on close() instead of a FIN. This RST will abort the
// connection immediately, whether or not the client had received the GOAWAY.
//
// Ideally we should delay for at least 1 RTT + epsilon so the client has
// a chance to read the GOAWAY and stop sending messages. Measuring RTT
// is hard, so we approximate with 1 second. See golang.org/issue/18701.
//
// This is a var so it can be shorter in tests, where all requests uses the
// loopback interface making the expected RTT very small.
//
// TODO: configurable?
var goAwayTimeout = 1 * time.Second
func (sc *serverConn) startGracefulShutdownInternal() {
sc.goAway(ErrCodeNo)
}
func (sc *serverConn) goAwayIn(code ErrCode, forceCloseIn time.Duration) {
func (sc *serverConn) goAway(code ErrCode) {
sc.serveG.check()
if sc.inGoAway {
return
}
if forceCloseIn != 0 {
sc.shutDownIn(forceCloseIn)
}
sc.inGoAway = true
sc.needToSendGoAway = true
sc.goAwayCode = code
@ -1160,8 +1276,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) goAwayIn(code ErrCode, forceCloseIn time.Duration) {
func (sc *serverConn) shutDownIn(d time.Duration) {
sc.serveG.check()
sc.shutdownTimer = time.NewTimer(d)
sc.shutdownTimerCh = sc.shutdownTimer.C
sc.shutdownTimer = time.AfterFunc(d, sc.onShutdownTimer)
}
func (sc *serverConn) resetStream(se StreamError) {
@ -1359,7 +1474,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) closeStream(st *stream, err error) {
sc.idleTimer.Reset(sc.srv.IdleTimeout)
}
if h1ServerKeepAlivesDisabled(sc.hs) {
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
}
}
if p := st.body; p != nil {
@ -1385,6 +1500,12 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processSettings(f *SettingsFrame) error {
}
return nil
}
if f.NumSettings() > 100 || f.HasDuplicates() {
// This isn't actually in the spec, but hang up on
// suspiciously large settings frames or those with
// duplicate entries.
return ConnectionError(ErrCodeProtocol)
}
if err := f.ForeachSetting(sc.processSetting); err != nil {
return err
}
@ -1506,7 +1627,10 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processData(f *DataFrame) error {
// Sender sending more than they'd declared?
if st.declBodyBytes != -1 && st.bodyBytes+int64(len(data)) > st.declBodyBytes {
st.body.CloseWithError(fmt.Errorf("sender tried to send more than declared Content-Length of %d bytes", st.declBodyBytes))
return streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed)
// RFC 7540, sec 8.1.2.6: A request or response is also malformed if the
// value of a content-length header field does not equal the sum of the
// DATA frame payload lengths that form the body.
return streamError(id, ErrCodeProtocol)
}
if f.Length > 0 {
// Check whether the client has flow control quota.
@ -1546,7 +1670,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processGoAway(f *GoAwayFrame) error {
} else {
sc.vlogf("http2: received GOAWAY %+v, starting graceful shutdown", f)
}
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-6.8
// We should not create any new streams, which means we should disable push.
sc.pushEnabled = false
@ -1616,6 +1740,13 @@ func (sc *serverConn) processHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
// processing this frame.
return nil
}
// RFC 7540, sec 5.1: If an endpoint receives additional frames, other than
// WINDOW_UPDATE, PRIORITY, or RST_STREAM, for a stream that is in
// this state, it MUST respond with a stream error (Section 5.4.2) of
// type STREAM_CLOSED.
if st.state == stateHalfClosedRemote {
return streamError(id, ErrCodeStreamClosed)
}
return st.processTrailerHeaders(f)
}
@ -1716,7 +1847,7 @@ func (st *stream) processTrailerHeaders(f *MetaHeadersFrame) error {
if st.trailer != nil {
for _, hf := range f.RegularFields() {
key := sc.canonicalHeader(hf.Name)
if !ValidTrailerHeader(key) {
if !httpguts.ValidTrailerHeader(key) {
// TODO: send more details to the peer somehow. But http2 has
// no way to send debug data at a stream level. Discuss with
// HTTP folk.
@ -1757,7 +1888,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newStream(id, pusherID uint32, state streamState) *stream
panic("internal error: cannot create stream with id 0")
}
ctx, cancelCtx := contextWithCancel(sc.baseCtx)
ctx, cancelCtx := context.WithCancel(sc.baseCtx)
st := &stream{
sc: sc,
id: id,
@ -1923,7 +2054,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) newWriterAndRequestNoBody(st *stream, rp requestParam) (*r
Body: body,
Trailer: trailer,
}
req = requestWithContext(req, st.ctx)
req = req.WithContext(st.ctx)
rws := responseWriterStatePool.Get().(*responseWriterState)
bwSave := rws.bw
@ -1951,7 +2082,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) runHandler(rw *responseWriter, req *http.Request, handler
stream: rw.rws.stream,
})
// Same as net/http:
if shouldLogPanic(e) {
if e != nil && e != http.ErrAbortHandler {
const size = 64 << 10
buf := make([]byte, size)
buf = buf[:runtime.Stack(buf, false)]
@ -2163,6 +2294,7 @@ type responseWriterState struct {
wroteHeader bool // WriteHeader called (explicitly or implicitly). Not necessarily sent to user yet.
sentHeader bool // have we sent the header frame?
handlerDone bool // handler has finished
dirty bool // a Write failed; don't reuse this responseWriterState
sentContentLen int64 // non-zero if handler set a Content-Length header
wroteBytes int64
@ -2182,8 +2314,8 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) hasTrailers() bool { return len(rws.trailers) !=
// written in the trailers at the end of the response.
func (rws *responseWriterState) declareTrailer(k string) {
k = http.CanonicalHeaderKey(k)
if !ValidTrailerHeader(k) {
// Forbidden by RFC 2616 14.40.
if !httpguts.ValidTrailerHeader(k) {
// Forbidden by RFC 7230, section 4.1.2.
rws.conn.logf("ignoring invalid trailer %q", k)
return
}
@ -2220,7 +2352,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
clen = strconv.Itoa(len(p))
}
_, hasContentType := rws.snapHeader["Content-Type"]
if !hasContentType && bodyAllowedForStatus(rws.status) {
if !hasContentType && bodyAllowedForStatus(rws.status) && len(p) > 0 {
ctype = http.DetectContentType(p)
}
var date string
@ -2233,6 +2365,19 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
foreachHeaderElement(v, rws.declareTrailer)
}
// "Connection" headers aren't allowed in HTTP/2 (RFC 7540, 8.1.2.2),
// but respect "Connection" == "close" to mean sending a GOAWAY and tearing
// down the TCP connection when idle, like we do for HTTP/1.
// TODO: remove more Connection-specific header fields here, in addition
// to "Connection".
if _, ok := rws.snapHeader["Connection"]; ok {
v := rws.snapHeader.Get("Connection")
delete(rws.snapHeader, "Connection")
if v == "close" {
rws.conn.startGracefulShutdown()
}
}
endStream := (rws.handlerDone && !rws.hasTrailers() && len(p) == 0) || isHeadResp
err = rws.conn.writeHeaders(rws.stream, &writeResHeaders{
streamID: rws.stream.id,
@ -2244,6 +2389,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
date: date,
})
if err != nil {
rws.dirty = true
return 0, err
}
if endStream {
@ -2265,6 +2411,7 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
if len(p) > 0 || endStream {
// only send a 0 byte DATA frame if we're ending the stream.
if err := rws.conn.writeDataFromHandler(rws.stream, p, endStream); err != nil {
rws.dirty = true
return 0, err
}
}
@ -2276,6 +2423,9 @@ func (rws *responseWriterState) writeChunk(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
trailers: rws.trailers,
endStream: true,
})
if err != nil {
rws.dirty = true
}
return len(p), err
}
return len(p), nil
@ -2299,7 +2449,7 @@ const TrailerPrefix = "Trailer:"
// after the header has already been flushed. Because the Go
// ResponseWriter interface has no way to set Trailers (only the
// Header), and because we didn't want to expand the ResponseWriter
// interface, and because nobody used trailers, and because RFC 2616
// interface, and because nobody used trailers, and because RFC 7230
// says you SHOULD (but not must) predeclare any trailers in the
// header, the official ResponseWriter rules said trailers in Go must
// be predeclared, and then we reuse the same ResponseWriter.Header()
@ -2383,6 +2533,24 @@ func (w *responseWriter) Header() http.Header {
return rws.handlerHeader
}
// checkWriteHeaderCode is a copy of net/http's checkWriteHeaderCode.
func checkWriteHeaderCode(code int) {
// Issue 22880: require valid WriteHeader status codes.
// For now we only enforce that it's three digits.
// In the future we might block things over 599 (600 and above aren't defined
// at http://httpwg.org/specs/rfc7231.html#status.codes)
// and we might block under 200 (once we have more mature 1xx support).
// But for now any three digits.
//
// We used to send "HTTP/1.1 000 0" on the wire in responses but there's
// no equivalent bogus thing we can realistically send in HTTP/2,
// so we'll consistently panic instead and help people find their bugs
// early. (We can't return an error from WriteHeader even if we wanted to.)
if code < 100 || code > 999 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("invalid WriteHeader code %v", code))
}
}
func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
rws := w.rws
if rws == nil {
@ -2393,6 +2561,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
func (rws *responseWriterState) writeHeader(code int) {
if !rws.wroteHeader {
checkWriteHeaderCode(code)
rws.wroteHeader = true
rws.status = code
if len(rws.handlerHeader) > 0 {
@ -2415,7 +2584,7 @@ func cloneHeader(h http.Header) http.Header {
//
// * Handler calls w.Write or w.WriteString ->
// * -> rws.bw (*bufio.Writer) ->
// * (Handler migth call Flush)
// * (Handler might call Flush)
// * -> chunkWriter{rws}
// * -> responseWriterState.writeChunk(p []byte)
// * -> responseWriterState.writeChunk (most of the magic; see comment there)
@ -2454,10 +2623,19 @@ func (w *responseWriter) write(lenData int, dataB []byte, dataS string) (n int,
func (w *responseWriter) handlerDone() {
rws := w.rws
dirty := rws.dirty
rws.handlerDone = true
w.Flush()
w.rws = nil
responseWriterStatePool.Put(rws)
if !dirty {
// Only recycle the pool if all prior Write calls to
// the serverConn goroutine completed successfully. If
// they returned earlier due to resets from the peer
// there might still be write goroutines outstanding
// from the serverConn referencing the rws memory. See
// issue 20704.
responseWriterStatePool.Put(rws)
}
}
// Push errors.
@ -2466,14 +2644,9 @@ var (
ErrPushLimitReached = errors.New("http2: push would exceed peer's SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS")
)
// pushOptions is the internal version of http.PushOptions, which we
// cannot include here because it's only defined in Go 1.8 and later.
type pushOptions struct {
Method string
Header http.Header
}
var _ http.Pusher = (*responseWriter)(nil)
func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
func (w *responseWriter) Push(target string, opts *http.PushOptions) error {
st := w.rws.stream
sc := st.sc
sc.serveG.checkNotOn()
@ -2484,6 +2657,10 @@ func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
return ErrRecursivePush
}
if opts == nil {
opts = new(http.PushOptions)
}
// Default options.
if opts.Method == "" {
opts.Method = "GET"
@ -2539,7 +2716,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
return fmt.Errorf("method %q must be GET or HEAD", opts.Method)
}
msg := startPushRequest{
msg := &startPushRequest{
parent: st,
method: opts.Method,
url: u,
@ -2552,7 +2729,7 @@ func (w *responseWriter) push(target string, opts pushOptions) error {
return errClientDisconnected
case <-st.cw:
return errStreamClosed
case sc.wantStartPushCh <- msg:
case sc.serveMsgCh <- msg:
}
select {
@ -2574,7 +2751,7 @@ type startPushRequest struct {
done chan error
}
func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg startPushRequest) {
func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg *startPushRequest) {
sc.serveG.check()
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-6.6.
@ -2613,7 +2790,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg startPushRequest) {
// A server that is unable to establish a new stream identifier can send a GOAWAY
// frame so that the client is forced to open a new connection for new streams.
if sc.maxPushPromiseID+2 >= 1<<31 {
sc.startGracefulShutdown()
sc.startGracefulShutdownInternal()
return 0, ErrPushLimitReached
}
sc.maxPushPromiseID += 2
@ -2655,7 +2832,7 @@ func (sc *serverConn) startPush(msg startPushRequest) {
}
// foreachHeaderElement splits v according to the "#rule" construction
// in RFC 2616 section 2.1 and calls fn for each non-empty element.
// in RFC 7230 section 7 and calls fn for each non-empty element.
func foreachHeaderElement(v string, fn func(string)) {
v = textproto.TrimString(v)
if v == "" {
@ -2703,66 +2880,6 @@ func new400Handler(err error) http.HandlerFunc {
}
}
// ValidTrailerHeader reports whether name is a valid header field name to appear
// in trailers.
// See: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-4.1.2
func ValidTrailerHeader(name string) bool {
name = http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)
if strings.HasPrefix(name, "If-") || badTrailer[name] {
return false
}
return true
}
var badTrailer = map[string]bool{
"Authorization": true,
"Cache-Control": true,
"Connection": true,
"Content-Encoding": true,
"Content-Length": true,
"Content-Range": true,
"Content-Type": true,
"Expect": true,
"Host": true,
"Keep-Alive": true,
"Max-Forwards": true,
"Pragma": true,
"Proxy-Authenticate": true,
"Proxy-Authorization": true,
"Proxy-Connection": true,
"Range": true,
"Realm": true,
"Te": true,
"Trailer": true,
"Transfer-Encoding": true,
"Www-Authenticate": true,
}
// h1ServerShutdownChan returns a channel that will be closed when the
// provided *http.Server wants to shut down.
//
// This is a somewhat hacky way to get at http1 innards. It works
// when the http2 code is bundled into the net/http package in the
// standard library. The alternatives ended up making the cmd/go tool
// depend on http Servers. This is the lightest option for now.
// This is tested via the TestServeShutdown* tests in net/http.
func h1ServerShutdownChan(hs *http.Server) <-chan struct{} {
if fn := testh1ServerShutdownChan; fn != nil {
return fn(hs)
}
var x interface{} = hs
type I interface {
getDoneChan() <-chan struct{}
}
if hs, ok := x.(I); ok {
return hs.getDoneChan()
}
return nil
}
// optional test hook for h1ServerShutdownChan.
var testh1ServerShutdownChan func(hs *http.Server) <-chan struct{}
// h1ServerKeepAlivesDisabled reports whether hs has its keep-alives
// disabled. See comments on h1ServerShutdownChan above for why
// the code is written this way.

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ import (
"log"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"time"
"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
"golang.org/x/net/http2/hpack"
"golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex"
)
// writeFramer is implemented by any type that is used to write frames.
@ -90,11 +89,7 @@ type writeGoAway struct {
func (p *writeGoAway) writeFrame(ctx writeContext) error {
err := ctx.Framer().WriteGoAway(p.maxStreamID, p.code, nil)
if p.code != 0 {
ctx.Flush() // ignore error: we're hanging up on them anyway
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
ctx.CloseConn()
}
ctx.Flush() // ignore error: we're hanging up on them anyway
return err
}
@ -204,7 +199,7 @@ func (w *writeResHeaders) staysWithinBuffer(max int) bool {
// TODO: this is a common one. It'd be nice to return true
// here and get into the fast path if we could be clever and
// calculate the size fast enough, or at least a conservative
// uppper bound that usually fires. (Maybe if w.h and
// upper bound that usually fires. (Maybe if w.h and
// w.trailers are nil, so we don't need to enumerate it.)
// Otherwise I'm afraid that just calculating the length to
// answer this question would be slower than the ~2µs benefit.
@ -334,7 +329,7 @@ func (wu writeWindowUpdate) writeFrame(ctx writeContext) error {
}
// encodeHeaders encodes an http.Header. If keys is not nil, then (k, h[k])
// is encoded only only if k is in keys.
// is encoded only if k is in keys.
func encodeHeaders(enc *hpack.Encoder, h http.Header, keys []string) {
if keys == nil {
sorter := sorterPool.Get().(*sorter)
@ -355,7 +350,7 @@ func encodeHeaders(enc *hpack.Encoder, h http.Header, keys []string) {
}
isTE := k == "transfer-encoding"
for _, v := range vv {
if !httplex.ValidHeaderFieldValue(v) {
if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(v) {
// TODO: return an error? golang.org/issue/14048
// For now just omit it.
continue

@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ type PriorityWriteSchedulerConfig struct {
}
// NewPriorityWriteScheduler constructs a WriteScheduler that schedules
// frames by following HTTP/2 priorities as described in RFC 7340 Section 5.3.
// frames by following HTTP/2 priorities as described in RFC 7540 Section 5.3.
// If cfg is nil, default options are used.
func NewPriorityWriteScheduler(cfg *PriorityWriteSchedulerConfig) WriteScheduler {
if cfg == nil {

@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// Package httplex contains rules around lexical matters of various
// HTTP-related specifications.
//
// This package is shared by the standard library (which vendors it)
// and x/net/http2. It comes with no API stability promise.
package httplex
import (
"net"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"golang.org/x/net/idna"
)
var isTokenTable = [127]bool{
'!': true,
'#': true,
'$': true,
'%': true,
'&': true,
'\'': true,
'*': true,
'+': true,
'-': true,
'.': true,
'0': true,
'1': true,
'2': true,
'3': true,
'4': true,
'5': true,
'6': true,
'7': true,
'8': true,
'9': true,
'A': true,
'B': true,
'C': true,
'D': true,
'E': true,
'F': true,
'G': true,
'H': true,
'I': true,
'J': true,
'K': true,
'L': true,
'M': true,
'N': true,
'O': true,
'P': true,
'Q': true,
'R': true,
'S': true,
'T': true,
'U': true,
'W': true,
'V': true,
'X': true,
'Y': true,
'Z': true,
'^': true,
'_': true,
'`': true,
'a': true,
'b': true,
'c': true,
'd': true,
'e': true,
'f': true,
'g': true,
'h': true,
'i': true,
'j': true,
'k': true,
'l': true,
'm': true,
'n': true,
'o': true,
'p': true,
'q': true,
'r': true,
's': true,
't': true,
'u': true,
'v': true,
'w': true,
'x': true,
'y': true,
'z': true,
'|': true,
'~': true,
}
func IsTokenRune(r rune) bool {
i := int(r)
return i < len(isTokenTable) && isTokenTable[i]
}
func isNotToken(r rune) bool {
return !IsTokenRune(r)
}
// HeaderValuesContainsToken reports whether any string in values
// contains the provided token, ASCII case-insensitively.
func HeaderValuesContainsToken(values []string, token string) bool {
for _, v := range values {
if headerValueContainsToken(v, token) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isOWS reports whether b is an optional whitespace byte, as defined
// by RFC 7230 section 3.2.3.
func isOWS(b byte) bool { return b == ' ' || b == '\t' }
// trimOWS returns x with all optional whitespace removes from the
// beginning and end.
func trimOWS(x string) string {
// TODO: consider using strings.Trim(x, " \t") instead,
// if and when it's fast enough. See issue 10292.
// But this ASCII-only code will probably always beat UTF-8
// aware code.
for len(x) > 0 && isOWS(x[0]) {
x = x[1:]
}
for len(x) > 0 && isOWS(x[len(x)-1]) {
x = x[:len(x)-1]
}
return x
}
// headerValueContainsToken reports whether v (assumed to be a
// 0#element, in the ABNF extension described in RFC 7230 section 7)
// contains token amongst its comma-separated tokens, ASCII
// case-insensitively.
func headerValueContainsToken(v string, token string) bool {
v = trimOWS(v)
if comma := strings.IndexByte(v, ','); comma != -1 {
return tokenEqual(trimOWS(v[:comma]), token) || headerValueContainsToken(v[comma+1:], token)
}
return tokenEqual(v, token)
}
// lowerASCII returns the ASCII lowercase version of b.
func lowerASCII(b byte) byte {
if 'A' <= b && b <= 'Z' {
return b + ('a' - 'A')
}
return b
}
// tokenEqual reports whether t1 and t2 are equal, ASCII case-insensitively.
func tokenEqual(t1, t2 string) bool {
if len(t1) != len(t2) {
return false
}
for i, b := range t1 {
if b >= utf8.RuneSelf {
// No UTF-8 or non-ASCII allowed in tokens.
return false
}
if lowerASCII(byte(b)) != lowerASCII(t2[i]) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// isLWS reports whether b is linear white space, according
// to http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2
// LWS = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
func isLWS(b byte) bool { return b == ' ' || b == '\t' }
// isCTL reports whether b is a control byte, according
// to http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2
// CTL = <any US-ASCII control character
// (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
func isCTL(b byte) bool {
const del = 0x7f // a CTL
return b < ' ' || b == del
}
// ValidHeaderFieldName reports whether v is a valid HTTP/1.x header name.
// HTTP/2 imposes the additional restriction that uppercase ASCII
// letters are not allowed.
//
// RFC 7230 says:
// header-field = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
// field-name = token
// token = 1*tchar
// tchar = "!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "." /
// "^" / "_" / "`" / "|" / "~" / DIGIT / ALPHA
func ValidHeaderFieldName(v string) bool {
if len(v) == 0 {
return false
}
for _, r := range v {
if !IsTokenRune(r) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// ValidHostHeader reports whether h is a valid host header.
func ValidHostHeader(h string) bool {
// The latest spec is actually this:
//
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4
// Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]
//
// Where uri-host is:
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2
//
// But we're going to be much more lenient for now and just
// search for any byte that's not a valid byte in any of those
// expressions.
for i := 0; i < len(h); i++ {
if !validHostByte[h[i]] {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// See the validHostHeader comment.
var validHostByte = [256]bool{
'0': true, '1': true, '2': true, '3': true, '4': true, '5': true, '6': true, '7': true,
'8': true, '9': true,
'a': true, 'b': true, 'c': true, 'd': true, 'e': true, 'f': true, 'g': true, 'h': true,
'i': true, 'j': true, 'k': true, 'l': true, 'm': true, 'n': true, 'o': true, 'p': true,
'q': true, 'r': true, 's': true, 't': true, 'u': true, 'v': true, 'w': true, 'x': true,
'y': true, 'z': true,
'A': true, 'B': true, 'C': true, 'D': true, 'E': true, 'F': true, 'G': true, 'H': true,
'I': true, 'J': true, 'K': true, 'L': true, 'M': true, 'N': true, 'O': true, 'P': true,
'Q': true, 'R': true, 'S': true, 'T': true, 'U': true, 'V': true, 'W': true, 'X': true,
'Y': true, 'Z': true,
'!': true, // sub-delims
'$': true, // sub-delims
'%': true, // pct-encoded (and used in IPv6 zones)
'&': true, // sub-delims
'(': true, // sub-delims
')': true, // sub-delims
'*': true, // sub-delims
'+': true, // sub-delims
',': true, // sub-delims
'-': true, // unreserved
'.': true, // unreserved
':': true, // IPv6address + Host expression's optional port
';': true, // sub-delims
'=': true, // sub-delims
'[': true,
'\'': true, // sub-delims
']': true,
'_': true, // unreserved
'~': true, // unreserved
}
// ValidHeaderFieldValue reports whether v is a valid "field-value" according to
// http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.2 :
//
// message-header = field-name ":" [ field-value ]
// field-value = *( field-content | LWS )
// field-content = <the OCTETs making up the field-value
// and consisting of either *TEXT or combinations
// of token, separators, and quoted-string>
//
// http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec2.html#sec2.2 :
//
// TEXT = <any OCTET except CTLs,
// but including LWS>
// LWS = [CRLF] 1*( SP | HT )
// CTL = <any US-ASCII control character
// (octets 0 - 31) and DEL (127)>
//
// RFC 7230 says:
// field-value = *( field-content / obs-fold )
// obj-fold = N/A to http2, and deprecated
// field-content = field-vchar [ 1*( SP / HTAB ) field-vchar ]
// field-vchar = VCHAR / obs-text
// obs-text = %x80-FF
// VCHAR = "any visible [USASCII] character"
//
// http2 further says: "Similarly, HTTP/2 allows header field values
// that are not valid. While most of the values that can be encoded
// will not alter header field parsing, carriage return (CR, ASCII
// 0xd), line feed (LF, ASCII 0xa), and the zero character (NUL, ASCII
// 0x0) might be exploited by an attacker if they are translated
// verbatim. Any request or response that contains a character not
// permitted in a header field value MUST be treated as malformed
// (Section 8.1.2.6). Valid characters are defined by the
// field-content ABNF rule in Section 3.2 of [RFC7230]."
//
// This function does not (yet?) properly handle the rejection of
// strings that begin or end with SP or HTAB.
func ValidHeaderFieldValue(v string) bool {
for i := 0; i < len(v); i++ {
b := v[i]
if isCTL(b) && !isLWS(b) {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func isASCII(s string) bool {
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
if s[i] >= utf8.RuneSelf {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// PunycodeHostPort returns the IDNA Punycode version
// of the provided "host" or "host:port" string.
func PunycodeHostPort(v string) (string, error) {
if isASCII(v) {
return v, nil
}
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(v)
if err != nil {
// The input 'v' argument was just a "host" argument,
// without a port. This error should not be returned
// to the caller.
host = v
port = ""
}
host, err = idna.ToASCII(host)
if err != nil {
// Non-UTF-8? Not representable in Punycode, in any
// case.
return "", err
}
if port == "" {
return host, nil
}
return net.JoinHostPort(host, port), nil
}

12
vendor/vendor.json vendored

@ -1083,10 +1083,10 @@
"revisionTime": "2018-05-30T06:29:46Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "Zh++JEDfXo0DKQtoKVfScwVdvww=",
"checksumSHA1": "pMsrfJZ8JwoPT2pBa1loXKhGODQ=",
"path": "golang.org/x/net/http2",
"revision": "da118f7b8e5954f39d0d2130ab35d4bf0e3cb344",
"revisionTime": "2017-04-23T14:02:46Z"
"revision": "9f648a60d9775ef5c977e7669d1673a7a67bef33",
"revisionTime": "2019-03-13T06:50:29Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "CBoO1DFToP49Ezph60yZ4J4PBBs=",
@ -1112,12 +1112,6 @@
"revision": "da118f7b8e5954f39d0d2130ab35d4bf0e3cb344",
"revisionTime": "2017-04-23T14:02:46Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "3xyuaSNmClqG4YWC7g0isQIbUTc=",
"path": "golang.org/x/net/lex/httplex",
"revision": "da118f7b8e5954f39d0d2130ab35d4bf0e3cb344",
"revisionTime": "2017-04-23T14:02:46Z"
},
{
"checksumSHA1": "mCMW3hvbWFW1k5il9yyO7ELOdws=",
"path": "golang.org/x/net/proxy",

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