freifunkist-firmware/target/linux/layerscape/patches-4.14/817-platform-security-support-layerscape.patch

From d2e808b0dcca1b5e850274f770775c355ae36c48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Biwen Li <biwen.li@nxp.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 18:27:03 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 34/40] platfrom-security: support layerscape
This is an integrated patch of platform-security for
 layerscape

Signed-off-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Biwen Li <biwen.li@nxp.com>
---
 Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst    |  67 ++
 MAINTAINERS                                   |  12 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig                     |   8 +
 drivers/tee/optee/core.c                      |   2 +-
 include/keys/secure-type.h                    |  33 +
 security/keys/Kconfig                         |  11 +
 security/keys/Makefile                        |   5 +
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile         |   2 +
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c      |  13 +-
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h      |  13 +
 .../keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_secure.c    |  37 ++
 security/keys/secure_key.c                    | 339 ++++++++++
 security/keys/securekey_desc.c                | 608 ++++++++++++++++++
 security/keys/securekey_desc.h                | 141 ++++
 14 files changed, 1288 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst
 create mode 100644 include/keys/secure-type.h
 create mode 100644 security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_secure.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/secure_key.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/securekey_desc.c
 create mode 100644 security/keys/securekey_desc.h

--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+==========
+Secure Key
+==========
+
+Secure key is the new type added to kernel key ring service.
+Secure key is a symmetric type key of minimum length 32 bytes
+and with maximum possible length to be 128 bytes. It is produced
+in kernel using the CAAM crypto engine. Userspace can only see
+the blob for the corresponding key. All the blobs are displayed
+or loaded in hex ascii.
+
+Secure key can be created on platforms which supports CAAM
+hardware block. Secure key can also be used as a master key to
+create the encrypted keys along with the existing key types in
+kernel.
+
+Secure key uses CAAM hardware to generate the key and blobify its
+content for userspace. Generated blobs are tied up with the hardware
+secret key stored in CAAM, hence the same blob will not be able to
+de-blobify with the different secret key on another machine.
+
+Usage::
+
+	keyctl add secure <name> "new <keylen>" <ring>
+	keyctl load secure <name> "load <hex_blob>" <ring>
+	keyctl print <key_id>
+
+"keyctl add secure" option will create the random data of the
+specified key len using CAAM and store it as a key in kernel.
+Key contents will be displayed as blobs to the user in hex ascii.
+User can input key len from 32 bytes to 128 bytes.
+
+"keyctl load secure" option will load the blob contents. In kernel,
+key will be deirved using input blob and CAAM, along with the secret
+key stored in CAAM.
+
+"keyctl print" will return the hex string of the blob corresponding to
+key_id. Returned blob will be of key_len + 48 bytes. Extra 48 bytes are
+the header bytes added by the CAAM.
+
+Example of secure key usage::
+
+1. Create the secure key with name kmk-master of length 32 bytes::
+
+	$ keyctl add secure kmk-master "new 32" @u
+	46001928
+
+	$keyctl show
+	Session Keyring
+	1030783626 --alswrv      0 65534  keyring: _uid_ses.0
+	 695927745 --alswrv      0 65534   \_ keyring: _uid.0
+	  46001928 --als-rv      0     0       \_ secure: kmk-master
+
+2. Print the blob contents for the kmk-master key::
+
+	$ keyctl print 46001928
+	d9743445b640f3d59c1670dddc0bc9c2
+	34fc9aab7dd05c965e6120025012f029b
+	07faa4776c4f6ed02899e35a135531e9a
+	6e5c2b51132f9d5aef28f68738e658296
+	3fe583177cfe50d2542b659a13039
+
+	$ keyctl pipe 46001928 > secure_key.blob
+
+3. Load the blob in the user key ring::
+
+	$ keyctl load secure kmk-master "load 'cat secure_key.blob'" @u
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -7645,6 +7645,18 @@ F:	include/keys/trusted-type.h
 F:	security/keys/trusted.c
 F:	security/keys/trusted.h
 
+KEYS-SECURE
+M:	Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>
+R:	Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>
+L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
+L:	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
+S:	Supported
+F:	include/keys/secure-type.h
+F:	security/keys/secure_key.c
+F:	security/keys/securekey_desc.c
+F:	security/keys/securekey_desc.h
+F:	security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_secure.c
+
 KEYS/KEYRINGS:
 M:	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
 L:	keyrings@vger.kernel.org
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
@@ -5,3 +5,11 @@ config OPTEE
 	help
 	  This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
 	  driver.
+
+config OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES
+	int "Private Shared Memory Pages"
+	default 1
+	depends on OPTEE
+	help
+	  This sets the number of private shared memory pages to be
+	  used by OP-TEE TEE driver.
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 
 #define DRIVER_NAME "optee"
 
-#define OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES	1
+#define OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES	CONFIG_OPTEE_SHM_NUM_PRIV_PAGES
 
 /**
  * optee_from_msg_param() - convert from OPTEE_MSG parameters to
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/keys/secure-type.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 NXP.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_SECURE_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_SECURE_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+/* Minimum key size to be used is 32 bytes and maximum key size fixed
+ * is 128 bytes.
+ * Blob size to be kept is Maximum key size + blob header added by CAAM.
+ */
+
+#define MIN_KEY_SIZE                    32
+#define MAX_KEY_SIZE                    128
+#define BLOB_HEADER_SIZE		48
+
+#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE                   (MAX_KEY_SIZE + BLOB_HEADER_SIZE)
+
+struct secure_key_payload {
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+	unsigned int key_len;
+	unsigned int blob_len;
+	unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1];
+	unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
+};
+
+extern struct key_type key_type_secure;
+#endif
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -71,6 +71,17 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS
 
 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
 
+config SECURE_KEYS
+	tristate "SECURE_KEYS"
+	depends on KEYS && CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM && CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR
+	help
+	  This option provide support for creating secure-type key and blobs
+	  in kernel. Secure keys are random number symmetric keys generated
+	  from CAAM. The CAAM creates the blobs for the random key.
+	  Userspace will only be able to see the blob.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
 config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
 	depends on KEYS
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -28,4 +28,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += dh.o
 #
 obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
+CFLAGS_secure_key.o += -I$(obj)/../../drivers/crypto/caam/
+CFLAGS_securekey_desc.o += -I$(obj)/../../drivers/crypto/caam/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS) += securekey.o
+securekey-y := securekey_desc.o \
+	       secure_key.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile
@@ -7,5 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypte
 
 encrypted-keys-y := encrypted.o ecryptfs_format.o
 masterkey-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) := masterkey_trusted.o
+masterkey-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS) := masterkey_secure.o
 masterkey-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS)-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) := masterkey_trusted.o
+masterkey-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS)-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) := masterkey_secure.o
 encrypted-keys-y += $(masterkey-y) $(masterkey-m-m)
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "ecryptfs_format.h"
 
 static const char KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX[] = "trusted:";
+static const char KEY_SECURE_PREFIX[] = "secure:";
 static const char KEY_USER_PREFIX[] = "user:";
 static const char hash_alg[] = "sha256";
 static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha256)";
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ static unsigned int ivsize;
 static int blksize;
 
 #define KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX) - 1)
+#define KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(KEY_SECURE_PREFIX) - 1)
 #define KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (KEY_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
 #define KEY_ECRYPTFS_DESC_LEN 16
 #define HASH_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
@@ -125,7 +127,7 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const cha
 /*
  * valid_master_desc - verify the 'key-type:desc' of a new/updated master-key
  *
- * key-type:= "trusted:" | "user:"
+ * key-type:= "trusted:" | "user:" | "secure:"
  * desc:= master-key description
  *
  * Verify that 'key-type' is valid and that 'desc' exists. On key update,
@@ -140,6 +142,8 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char
 
 	if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
 		prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_SECURE_PREFIX, KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN;
 	else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
 		prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
 	else
@@ -358,7 +362,7 @@ static int calc_hmac(u8 *digest, const u
 
 enum derived_key_type { ENC_KEY, AUTH_KEY };
 
-/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted key */
+/* Derive authentication/encryption key from trusted/secure key */
 static int get_derived_key(u8 *derived_key, enum derived_key_type key_type,
 			   const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
 {
@@ -429,6 +433,11 @@ static struct key *request_master_key(st
 		mkey = request_trusted_key(epayload->master_desc +
 					   KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN,
 					   master_key, master_keylen);
+	} else if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_SECURE_PREFIX,
+			    KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN)) {
+		mkey = request_secure_key(epayload->master_desc +
+					  KEY_SECURE_PREFIX_LEN,
+					  master_key, master_keylen);
 	} else if (!strncmp(epayload->master_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX,
 			    KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
 		mkey = request_user_key(epayload->master_desc +
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ static inline struct key *request_truste
 }
 #endif
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS)
+extern struct key *request_secure_key(const char *secure_desc,
+				      const u8 **master_key,
+				      size_t *master_keylen);
+#else
+static inline struct key *request_secure_key(const char *secure_desc,
+					     const u8 **master_key,
+					     size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+#endif
+
 #if ENCRYPTED_DEBUG
 static inline void dump_master_key(const u8 *master_key, size_t master_keylen)
 {
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_secure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 NXP.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <keys/secure-type.h>
+#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
+#include "encrypted.h"
+
+/*
+ * request_secure_key - request the secure key
+ *
+ * Secure keys and their blobs are derived from CAAM hardware.
+ * Userspace manages secure  key-type data, but key data is not
+ * visible in plain form. It is presented as blobs.
+ */
+struct key *request_secure_key(const char *secure_desc,
+				const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+{
+	struct secure_key_payload *spayload;
+	struct key *skey;
+
+	skey = request_key(&key_type_secure, secure_desc, NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(skey))
+		goto error;
+
+	down_read(&skey->sem);
+	spayload = skey->payload.data[0];
+	*master_key = spayload->key;
+	*master_keylen = spayload->key_len;
+error:
+	return skey;
+}
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/secure_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2018 NXP
+ * Secure key is generated using NXP CAAM hardware block. CAAM generates the
+ * random number (used as a key) and creates its blob for the user.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <keys/secure-type.h>
+#include <linux/completion.h>
+
+#include "securekey_desc.h"
+
+static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
+static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+
+static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
+static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
+
+enum {
+	error = -1,
+	new_key,
+	load_blob,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
+	{new_key, "new"},
+	{load_blob, "load"},
+	{error, NULL}
+};
+
+static struct secure_key_payload *secure_payload_alloc(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct secure_key_payload *sec_key = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*sec_key));
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	sec_key = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec_key), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sec_key)
+		goto out;
+
+out:
+	return sec_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse_inputdata - parse the keyctl input data and fill in the
+ *		     payload structure for key or its blob.
+ * param[in]: data pointer to the data to be parsed for creating key.
+ * param[in]: p pointer to secure key payload structure to fill parsed data
+ * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int parse_inputdata(char *data, struct secure_key_payload *p)
+{
+	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+	long keylen = 0;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	int key_cmd = -EINVAL;
+	char *c = NULL;
+
+	c = strsep(&data, " \t");
+	if (!c) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the keyctl command i.e. new_key or load_blob etc */
+	key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
+
+	switch (key_cmd) {
+	case new_key:
+		/* first argument is key size */
+		c = strsep(&data, " \t");
+		if (!c) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+		if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
+						keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		p->key_len = keylen;
+		ret = new_key;
+
+		break;
+	case load_blob:
+		/* first argument is blob data for CAAM*/
+		c = strsep(&data, " \t");
+		if (!c) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* Blob_len = No of characters in blob/2 */
+		p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
+		if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		ret = load_blob;
+
+		break;
+	case error:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * secure_instantiate - create a new secure type key.
+ * Supports the operation to generate a new key. A random number
+ * is generated from CAAM as key data and the corresponding red blob
+ * is formed and stored as key_blob.
+ * Also supports the operation to load the blob and key is derived using
+ * that blob from CAAM.
+ * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
+ */
+static int secure_instantiate(struct key *key,
+		struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	struct secure_key_payload *payload = NULL;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	char *data = NULL;
+	int key_cmd = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+	enum sk_req_type sk_op_type;
+	struct device *dev = NULL;
+
+	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
+	data[datalen] = '\0';
+
+	payload = secure_payload_alloc(key);
+	if (!payload) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate caam job ring for operation to be performed from CAAM */
+	dev = caam_jr_alloc();
+	if (!dev) {
+		pr_info("caam_jr_alloc failed\n");
+		ret = -ENODEV;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key_cmd = parse_inputdata(data, payload);
+	if (key_cmd < 0) {
+		ret = key_cmd;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	switch (key_cmd) {
+	case load_blob:
+		/*
+		 * Red blob decryption to be done for load operation
+		 * to derive the key.
+		 */
+		sk_op_type = sk_red_blob_dec;
+		ret = key_deblob(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			pr_info("secure_key: key_blob decap fail (%d)\n", ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	case new_key:
+		/* Get Random number from caam of the specified length */
+		sk_op_type = sk_get_random;
+		ret = caam_get_random(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			pr_info("secure_key: get_random fail (%d)\n", ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* Generate red blob of key random bytes with CAAM */
+		sk_op_type = sk_red_blob_enc;
+		ret = key_blob(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			pr_info("secure_key: key_blob encap fail (%d)\n", ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+out:
+	if (data)
+		kzfree(data);
+	if (dev)
+		caam_jr_free(dev);
+
+	if (!ret)
+		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
+	else
+		kzfree(payload);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * secure_read - copy the  blob data to userspace in hex.
+ * param[in]: key pointer to key struct
+ * param[in]: buffer pointer to user data for creating key
+ * param[in]: buflen is the length of the buffer
+ * On success, return to userspace the secure key data size.
+ */
+static long secure_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
+			 size_t buflen)
+{
+	const struct secure_key_payload *p = NULL;
+	char *ascii_buf;
+	char *bufp;
+	int i;
+
+	p = dereference_key_locked(key);
+	if (!p)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
+		ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ascii_buf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		bufp = ascii_buf;
+		for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+			bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+		if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {
+			kzfree(ascii_buf);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+		kzfree(ascii_buf);
+	}
+	return 2 * p->blob_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * secure_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
+ */
+static void secure_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+	kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+}
+
+struct key_type key_type_secure = {
+	.name = "secure",
+	.instantiate = secure_instantiate,
+	.destroy = secure_destroy,
+	.read = secure_read,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_secure);
+
+static void secure_shash_release(void)
+{
+	if (hashalg)
+		crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
+	if (hmacalg)
+		crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+}
+
+static int __init secure_shash_alloc(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
+		pr_info("secure_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+				hmac_alg);
+		return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
+	}
+
+	hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
+		pr_info("secure_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
+				hash_alg);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
+		goto hashalg_fail;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+hashalg_fail:
+	crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __init init_secure_key(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = secure_shash_alloc();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_secure);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		secure_shash_release();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_secure_key(void)
+{
+	secure_shash_release();
+	unregister_key_type(&key_type_secure);
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_secure_key);
+module_exit(cleanup_secure_key);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/securekey_desc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,608 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 NXP
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <keys/secure-type.h>
+#include "securekey_desc.h"
+
+/* key modifier for blob encapsulation & decapsulation descriptor */
+u8 key_modifier[] = "SECURE_KEY";
+u32 key_modifier_len = 10;
+
+void caam_sk_rng_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+	struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data = NULL;
+	struct random_desc *rnd_desc = NULL;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
+
+	init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+	fetch_rnd_data = &skreq->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
+	rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
+	len = fetch_rnd_data->key_len;
+
+	/* command 0x82500000 */
+	append_cmd(desc, CMD_OPERATION | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG |
+			OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG);
+	/* command 0x60340000 | len */
+	append_cmd(desc, CMD_FIFO_STORE | FIFOST_TYPE_RNGSTORE | len);
+	append_ptr(desc, rnd_desc->rnd_data);
+}
+
+void caam_sk_redblob_encap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+	struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc =
+					&skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
+	struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_req =
+					&skreq->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
+	u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
+
+	init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+	/* Load class 2 key with key modifier. */
+	append_key_as_imm(desc, key_modifier, key_modifier_len,
+			  key_modifier_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+
+	/* SEQ IN PTR Command. */
+	append_seq_in_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->in_data, red_blob_req->data_sz,
+			  0);
+
+	/* SEQ OUT PTR Command. */
+	append_seq_out_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+			   red_blob_req->redblob_sz, 0);
+
+	/* RedBlob encapsulation PROTOCOL Command. */
+	append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_ENCAP_PROTOCOL | OP_PCLID_BLOB);
+}
+
+/* void caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+ * brief CAAM Descriptor creator from redblob to plaindata.
+ * param[in] skreq Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ */
+void caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+	struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc =
+					&skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
+	struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_req =
+					&skreq->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
+	u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
+
+	init_job_desc(desc, 0);
+
+	/* Load class 2 key with key modifier. */
+	append_key_as_imm(desc, key_modifier, key_modifier_len,
+			  key_modifier_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
+
+	/* SEQ IN PTR Command. */
+	append_seq_in_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+			  red_blob_req->redblob_sz, 0);
+
+	/* SEQ OUT PTR Command. */
+	append_seq_out_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->out_data,
+			   red_blob_req->data_sz, 0);
+
+	/* RedBlob decapsulation PROTOCOL Command. */
+	append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_DECAP_PROTOCOL | OP_PCLID_BLOB);
+}
+
+/* int caam_sk_get_random_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+ *			      struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+ * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_sk_get_random_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+			   struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+	struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data;
+	struct random_desc *rnd_desc;
+
+	fetch_rnd_data = &req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
+	rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
+
+	rnd_desc->rnd_data = dma_map_single(dev, fetch_rnd_data->data,
+				fetch_rnd_data->key_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, rnd_desc->rnd_data)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+		goto sk_random_map_fail;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+sk_random_map_fail:
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/* int caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+ *					struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+ * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+			      struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+	struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_encap;
+	struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc;
+
+	red_blob_encap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
+	red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
+
+	red_blob_desc->in_data = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_encap->data,
+					red_blob_encap->data_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+		goto sk_data_fail;
+	}
+
+	red_blob_desc->redblob = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_encap->redblob,
+				red_blob_encap->redblob_sz, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+		goto sk_redblob_fail;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+sk_redblob_fail:
+	dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data, red_blob_encap->data_sz,
+			 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+sk_data_fail:
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/* static int caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(struct device *dev,
+ *					    struct sk_req *req,
+ *					    struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+ * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
+			      struct sk_desc *skdesc)
+{
+	struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_decap;
+	struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc;
+
+	red_blob_decap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
+	red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
+
+	red_blob_desc->redblob = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_decap->redblob,
+				red_blob_decap->redblob_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+		goto sk_redblob_fail;
+	}
+
+	red_blob_desc->out_data = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_decap->data,
+				red_blob_decap->data_sz, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->out_data)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
+		goto sk_data_fail;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+sk_data_fail:
+	dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+			 red_blob_decap->redblob_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+sk_redblob_fail:
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/* @fn void securekey_unmap(struct device *dev,
+ *			    struct sk_desc *skdesc, struct sk_req *req)
+ * @brief DMA unmap the buffer pointers.
+ * @param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * @param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
+ * @param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ */
+void securekey_unmap(struct device *dev,
+		     struct sk_desc *skdesc, struct sk_req *req)
+{
+
+	switch (req->type) {
+	case sk_get_random:
+		{
+			struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data;
+			struct random_desc *rnd_desc;
+
+			fetch_rnd_data = &req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
+			rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
+
+			/* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, rnd_desc->rnd_data,
+					 fetch_rnd_data->key_len,
+					 DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+			break;
+		}
+	case sk_red_blob_enc:
+		{
+			struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_encap;
+			struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc;
+
+			red_blob_encap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
+			red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
+
+			/* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data,
+					 red_blob_encap->data_sz,
+					 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+					 red_blob_encap->redblob_sz,
+					 DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+			break;
+		}
+	case sk_red_blob_dec:
+		{
+			struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_decap;
+			struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc;
+
+			red_blob_decap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
+			red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
+
+			/* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
+					 red_blob_decap->redblob_sz,
+					 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->out_data,
+					 red_blob_decap->data_sz,
+					 DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+
+			break;
+		}
+	default:
+		dev_err(dev, "Unable to find request type\n");
+		break;
+	}
+	kfree(skdesc);
+}
+
+/*  int caam_securekey_desc_init(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req)
+ *  brief CAAM Descriptor creator for secure key operations.
+ *  param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ *  param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ *  return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+int caam_securekey_desc_init(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req)
+{
+	struct sk_desc *skdesc = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	switch (req->type) {
+	case sk_get_random:
+		{
+			skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
+			if (!skdesc) {
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			skdesc->req_type = req->type;
+
+			if (caam_sk_get_random_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
+				dev_err(dev, "caam get_random map fail\n");
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			caam_sk_rng_desc(req, skdesc);
+			break;
+		}
+	case sk_red_blob_enc:
+		{
+			skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
+			if (!skdesc) {
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			skdesc->req_type = req->type;
+
+			if (caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
+				dev_err(dev, "caam redblob_encap map fail\n");
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			/* Descriptor function to create redblob from data. */
+			caam_sk_redblob_encap_desc(req, skdesc);
+			break;
+		}
+
+	case sk_red_blob_dec:
+		{
+			skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
+			if (!skdesc) {
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			skdesc->req_type = req->type;
+
+			if (caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
+				dev_err(dev, "caam redblob_decap map fail\n");
+				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			/* Descriptor function to decap data from redblob. */
+			caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(req, skdesc);
+			break;
+		}
+	default:
+		pr_debug("Unknown request type\n");
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	req->desc_pointer = (void *)skdesc;
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* static void caam_op_done (struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 ret,
+ *			     void *context)
+ * brief callback function to be called when descriptor executed.
+ * param[in] dev Pointer to device structure
+ * param[in] desc descriptor pointer
+ * param[in] ret return status of Job submitted
+ * param[in] context void pointer
+ */
+static void caam_op_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 ret,
+			 void *context)
+{
+	struct sk_req *req = context;
+
+	if (ret) {
+		dev_err(dev, "caam op done err: %x\n", ret);
+		/* print the error source name. */
+		caam_jr_strstatus(dev, ret);
+	}
+	/* Call securekey_unmap function for unmapping the buffer pointers. */
+	securekey_unmap(dev, req->desc_pointer, req);
+
+	req->ret = ret;
+	complete(&req->comp);
+}
+
+
+/*  static int sk_job_submit(struct device *jrdev, struct sk_req *req)
+ *  brief Enqueue a Job descriptor to Job ring and wait until SEC returns.
+ *  param[in] jrdev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ *  param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
+ *  return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
+ */
+static int sk_job_submit(struct device *jrdev, struct sk_req *req)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	init_completion(&req->comp);
+
+	/* caam_jr_enqueue function for Enqueue a job descriptor */
+	ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, req->hwdesc, caam_op_done, req);
+	if (!ret)
+		wait_for_completion_interruptible(&req->comp);
+
+	ret = req->ret;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p,  enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
+ *		   struct device *dev)
+ * Create the random number of the specified length using CAAM block
+ * param[in]: out pointer to place the random bytes
+ * param[in]: length for the random data bytes.
+ * param[in]: dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
+ */
+int caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p,  enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
+		    struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data = NULL;
+	struct sk_req *req = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+	void *temp = NULL;
+
+	req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
+	if (!req) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	req->type = fetch_rnd;
+	fetch_rnd_data = &(req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data);
+
+	/* initialise with key length */
+	fetch_rnd_data->key_len = p->key_len;
+
+	temp = kmalloc(fetch_rnd_data->key_len, GFP_DMA);
+	if (!temp) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	fetch_rnd_data->data = temp;
+
+	ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init failed\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
+	if (!ret) {
+		/*Copy output to key buffer. */
+		memcpy(p->key, fetch_rnd_data->data, p->key_len);
+	} else {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (req)
+		kfree(req);
+
+	if (temp)
+		kfree(temp);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(caam_get_random);
+
+/* key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type
+ *		struct device *dev)
+ * Deblobify the blob to get the key data and fill in secure key payload struct
+ * param[in] p pointer to the secure key payload
+ * param[in] decap_type operation to be done.
+ * param[in] dev dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
+ */
+int key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type,
+	       struct device *dev)
+{
+	unsigned int blob_len;
+	struct sk_red_blob_decap *d_blob;
+	struct sk_req *req = NULL;
+	int total_sz = 0, *temp = NULL, ret = 0;
+
+	req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
+	if (!req) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	d_blob = &(req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap);
+	blob_len = p->blob_len;
+	req->type = decap_type;
+
+	/*
+	 * Red blob size is the blob_len filled in payload struct
+	 * Data_sz i.e. key is the blob_len - blob header size
+	 */
+
+	d_blob->redblob_sz = blob_len;
+	d_blob->data_sz = blob_len - (SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ + SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ);
+	total_sz = d_blob->data_sz + d_blob->redblob_sz;
+
+	temp = kmalloc(total_sz, GFP_DMA);
+	if (!temp) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	req->mem_pointer = temp;
+	d_blob->redblob = temp;
+	d_blob->data = d_blob->redblob + d_blob->redblob_sz;
+	memcpy(d_blob->redblob, p->blob, blob_len);
+
+	ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init: Failed\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
+	if (!ret) {
+		/*Copy output to key buffer. */
+		p->key_len = d_blob->data_sz;
+		memcpy(p->key, d_blob->data, p->key_len);
+	} else {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (temp)
+		kfree(temp);
+	if (req)
+		kfree(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_deblob);
+
+/* key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
+ *		struct device *dev)
+ * To blobify the key data to get the blob. This blob can only be seen by
+ * userspace.
+ * param[in] p pointer to the secure key payload
+ * param[in] decap_type operation to be done.
+ * param[in] dev dev Pointer to job ring device structure
+ * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
+ */
+int key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
+	     struct device *dev)
+{
+	unsigned int key_len;
+	struct sk_red_blob_encap *k_blob;
+	struct sk_req *req = NULL;
+	int total_sz = 0, *temp = NULL, ret = 0;
+
+	req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
+	if (!req) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	key_len = p->key_len;
+
+	req->type = encap_type;
+	k_blob = &(req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap);
+
+	/*
+	 * Data_sz i.e. key len and the corresponding blob_len is
+	 * key_len + BLOB header size.
+	 */
+
+	k_blob->data_sz = key_len;
+	k_blob->redblob_sz = key_len + SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ + SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ;
+	total_sz = k_blob->data_sz + k_blob->redblob_sz;
+
+	temp = kmalloc(total_sz, GFP_DMA);
+	if (!temp) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	req->mem_pointer = temp;
+	k_blob->data = temp;
+
+	k_blob->redblob = k_blob->data + k_blob->data_sz;
+	memcpy(k_blob->data, p->key, key_len);
+
+	ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
+
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init failed\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
+	if (!ret) {
+		/*Copy output to key buffer. */
+		p->blob_len = k_blob->redblob_sz;
+		memcpy(p->blob, k_blob->redblob, p->blob_len);
+	} else {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (temp)
+		kfree(req->mem_pointer);
+	if (req)
+		kfree(req);
+	return ret;
+
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_blob);
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/securekey_desc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2018 NXP
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef _SECUREKEY_DESC_H_
+#define _SECUREKEY_DESC_H_
+
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "regs.h"
+#include "intern.h"
+#include "desc.h"
+#include "desc_constr.h"
+#include "jr.h"
+#include "error.h"
+#include "pdb.h"
+
+#define SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ		32	/* Blob key size. */
+#define SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ		16	/* Blob MAC size. */
+
+/*
+ * brief defines different kinds of operations supported by this module.
+ */
+enum sk_req_type {
+	sk_get_random,
+	sk_red_blob_enc,
+	sk_red_blob_dec,
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * struct random_des
+ * param[out] rnd_data output buffer for random data.
+ */
+struct random_desc {
+	dma_addr_t rnd_data;
+};
+
+/* struct redblob_encap_desc
+ * details Structure containing dma address for redblob encapsulation.
+ * param[in] in_data input data to redblob encap descriptor.
+ * param[out] redblob output buffer for redblob.
+ */
+struct redblob_encap_desc {
+	dma_addr_t in_data;
+	dma_addr_t redblob;
+};
+
+/* struct redblob_decap_desc
+ * details Structure containing dma address for redblob decapsulation.
+ * param[in] redblob input buffer to redblob decap descriptor.
+ * param[out] out_data output data from redblob decap descriptor.
+ */
+struct redblob_decap_desc {
+	dma_addr_t redblob;
+	dma_addr_t out_data;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_desc
+ * details Structure for securekey descriptor creation.
+ * param[in] req_type operation supported.
+ * param[in] dma_u union of struct for supported operation.
+ */
+struct sk_desc {
+	u32 req_type;
+	union {
+		struct redblob_encap_desc redblob_encapdesc;
+		struct redblob_decap_desc redblob_decapdesc;
+		struct random_desc random_descp;
+	} dma_u;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_fetch_rnd_data
+ * decriptor structure containing key length.
+ */
+struct sk_fetch_rnd_data {
+	void *data;
+	size_t key_len;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_red_blob_encap
+ * details Structure containing buffer pointers for redblob encapsulation.
+ * param[in] data Input data.
+ * param[in] data_sz size of Input data.
+ * param[out] redblob output buffer for redblob.
+ * param[in] redblob_sz size of redblob.
+ */
+struct sk_red_blob_encap {
+	void *data;
+	uint32_t data_sz;
+	void *redblob;
+	uint32_t redblob_sz;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_red_blob_decap
+ * details Structure containing buffer pointers for redblob decapsulation.
+ * param[in] redblob Input redblob.
+ * param[in] redblob_sz size of redblob.
+ * param[out] data output buffer for data.
+ * param[in] data_sz size of output data.
+ */
+struct sk_red_blob_decap {
+	void *redblob;
+	uint32_t redblob_sz;
+	void *data;
+	uint32_t data_sz;
+};
+
+/* struct sk_req
+ * details Structure for securekey request creation.
+ * param[in] type operation supported.
+ * param[in] req_u union of struct for supported operation.
+ * param[out] ret return status of CAAM operation.
+ * param[in] mem_pointer memory pointer for allocated kernel memory.
+ * param[in] desc_pointer Pointer to securekey descriptor creation structure.
+ * param[in] comp struct completion object.
+ * param[in] hwdesc contains descriptor instructions.
+ */
+struct sk_req {
+	enum sk_req_type type;
+	void *arg;
+	union {
+		struct sk_red_blob_encap sk_red_blob_encap;
+		struct sk_red_blob_decap sk_red_blob_decap;
+		struct sk_fetch_rnd_data sk_fetch_rnd_data;
+	} req_u;
+	int ret;
+	void *mem_pointer;
+	void *desc_pointer;
+	struct completion comp;
+	u32 hwdesc[MAX_CAAM_DESCSIZE];
+};
+
+int caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p,  enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
+		    struct device *dev);
+int key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
+	     struct device *dev);
+int key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type,
+	       struct device *dev);
+
+#endif /*_SECUREKEY_DESC_H_*/