Don't set the default firewall zone to wan if not specified to keep the
behavior aligned with other tunnel protocols like gre and 6rd.
If the interface zone is not specified try to get it from the firewall config
when constructing the procd firewall rule.
While at it only add procd inbound/outbound firewall rules if a zone is specified.
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
Don't set the default firewall zone to wan if not specified to keep the
behavior aligned with other tunnel protocols like gre and 6rd.
If the interface zone is not specified try to get it from the firewall config
when constructing the procd firewall rule.
While at it only add a procd inbound firewall rule if a zone is specified.
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* Feature: Add support for 200Gbps (50Gbps per lane) link mode
* Feature: simplify handling of PHY tunable downshift
* Feature: add support for PHY tunable Fast Link Down
* Feature: add PHY Fast Link Down tunable to man page
* Feature: Add a 'start N' option when specifying the Rx flow hash indirection table.
* Feature: Add bash-completion script
* Feature: add 10000baseR_FEC link mode name
* Fix: qsfp: fix special value comparison
* Feature: move option parsing related code into function
* Feature: move cmdline_coalesce out of do_scoalesce
* Feature: introduce new ioctl for per-queue settings
* Feature: support per-queue sub command --show-coalesce
* Feature: support per-queue sub command --coalesce
* Fix: fix up dump_coalesce output to match actual option names
* Feature: fec: add pretty dump
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
Commit "generic: ar8216: add mib_poll_interval switch attribute" has added
mib_poll_interval global config option and commit "generic: ar8216: group
MIB counters and use two basic ones only by default" has added mib_type
config option.
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
c9d9dbf pppoe: Custom host-uniq tag
44012ae plugins/rp-pppoe: Fix compile errors
Refresh patches
Drop 520-uniq patch as upstream accepted
Drop 150-debug_compile_fix patch as fixed upstream
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
22e8e58 interface-ip: use ptp address as well to find local address target
f1aa0f9 treewide: pass bool as second argument of blobmsg_check_attr
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
41a74cb config: remove 'ignore' config option
c0c8034 treewide: init assignment lists head
f98b7ee config: use list safe iterator in lease_delete
3c9810b dhcpv4: fix lease ordering by ip address
b60c384 config: use multi-stage parsing of uci sections
a2dd8d6 treewide: always init interface list heads during initialization
a17665e dhcpv4: do not allow pool end address to overlap with broadcast address
6b951c5 treewide: give file descriptors safe initial value
39e11ed dhcpv4: DHCP pool size is off-by-one
4a600ce dhcpv4: add support for Parameter Request List option 55
09e5eca dhcpv4: fix DHCP packet size
3cd4876 ndp: fix syslog flooding (FS#2242)
79fbba1 config: set default loglevel to LOG_WARNING
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
Missing header for va_list.
Signed-off-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
[updated with upstream version of the patch]
fcb076c Various fixes for errors found by coverity static analysis (#109)
d98ab38 Merge branch 'pppd_print_changes' of https://github.com/nlhintz/ppp into nlhintz-pppd_print_changes
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
This reverts commit c6aa9ff388.
Further testing has revealed that we will need to allow concurrent
requests after all, especially for situations where CGI processes
initiate further HTTP requests to the local host.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
24f9dc7 Iron out all extra compiler warnings
9d8dbc9 Enable extra compiler checks
ff8d356 mbim-proxy support
ccca03f umbim: add registration set support
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
EAP-pwd missing commit validation
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9497 (EAP-pwd server not checking for reflection attack)
- CVE-2019-9498 (EAP-pwd server missing commit validation for
scalar/element)
- CVE-2019-9499 (EAP-pwd peer missing commit validation for
scalar/element)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/
Vulnerability
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) was discovered not to validate the received scalar and element
values in EAP-pwd-Commit messages properly. This could result in attacks
that would be able to complete EAP-pwd authentication exchange without
the attacker having to know the used password.
A reflection attack is possible against the EAP-pwd server since the
hostapd EAP server did not verify that the EAP-pwd-Commit contains
scalar/element values that differ from the ones the server sent out
itself. This allows the attacker to complete EAP-pwd authentication
without knowing the password, but this does not result in the attacker
being able to derive the session key (MSK), i.e., the attacker would not
be able to complete the following key exchange (e.g., 4-way handshake in
RSN/WPA).
An attack using invalid scalar/element values is possible against both
the EAP-pwd server and peer since hostapd and wpa_supplicant did not
validate these values in the received EAP-pwd-Commit messages. If the
used crypto library does not implement additional checks for the element
(EC point), this could result in attacks where the attacker could use a
specially crafted commit message values to manipulate the exchange to
result in deriving a session key value from a very small set of possible
values. This could further be used to attack the EAP-pwd server in a
practical manner. An attack against the EAP-pwd peer is slightly more
complex, but still consider practical. These invalid scalar/element
attacks could result in the attacker being able to complete
authentication and learn the session key and MSK to allow the key
exchange to be completed as well, i.e., the attacker gaining access to
the network in case of the attack against the EAP server or the attacker
being able to operate a rogue AP in case of the attack against the EAP
peer.
While similar attacks might be applicable against SAE, it should be
noted that the SAE implementation in hostapd and wpa_supplicant does
have the validation steps that were missing from the EAP-pwd
implementation and as such, these attacks do not apply to the current
SAE implementation. Old versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd did not
include the reflection attack check in the SAE implementation, though,
since that was added in June 2015 for v2.5 (commit 6a58444d27fd 'SAE:
Verify that own/peer commit-scalar and COMMIT-ELEMENT are different').
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support (CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build
configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled in the runtime configuration)
are vulnerable against the reflection attack.
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration) are vulnerable against the invalid
scalar/element attack when built against a crypto library that does not
have an explicit validation step on imported EC points. The following
list indicates which cases are vulnerable/not vulnerable:
- OpenSSL v1.0.2 or older: vulnerable
- OpenSSL v1.1.0 or newer: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL with commit 38feb990a183 ('Require that EC points are on the
curve.') from September 2015: not vulnerable
- BoringSSL without commit 38feb990a183: vulnerable
- LibreSSL: vulnerable
- wolfssl: vulnerable
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) for discovering
and reporting the issues and for proposing changes to address them in
the implementation.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
CVE-2019-9497:
EAP-pwd server: Detect reflection attacks
CVE-2019-9498:
EAP-pwd server: Verify received scalar and element
EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
CVE-2019-9499:
EAP-pwd client: Verify received scalar and element
EAP-pwd: Check element x,y coordinates explicitly
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-4/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
hostapd: fix SAE confirm missing state validation
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9496 (SAE confirm missing state validation in hostapd/AP)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/
Vulnerability
When hostapd is used to operate an access point with SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals; also known as WPA3-Personal), an invalid
authentication sequence could result in the hostapd process terminating
due to a NULL pointer dereference when processing SAE confirm
message. This was caused by missing state validation steps when
processing the SAE confirm message in hostapd/AP mode.
Similar cases against the wpa_supplicant SAE station implementation had
already been tested by the hwsim test cases, but those sequences did not
trigger this specific code path in AP mode which is why the issue was
not discovered earlier.
An attacker in radio range of an access point using hostapd in SAE
configuration could use this issue to perform a denial of service attack
by forcing the hostapd process to terminate.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build
configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration).
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commit to hostapd and rebuild:
SAE: Fix confirm message validation in error cases
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-3/
- Update to hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
EAP-pwd side-channel attack
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- CVE-2019-9495 (cache attack against EAP-pwd)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/
Vulnerability
Number of potential side channel attacks were recently discovered in the
SAE implementations used by both hostapd and wpa_supplicant (see
security advisory 2019-1 and VU#871675). EAP-pwd uses a similar design
for deriving PWE from the password and while a specific attack against
EAP-pwd is not yet known to be tested, there is no reason to believe
that the EAP-pwd implementation would be immune against the type of
cache attack that was identified for the SAE implementation. Since the
EAP-pwd implementation in hostapd (EAP server) and wpa_supplicant (EAP
peer) does not support MODP groups, the timing attack described against
SAE is not applicable for the EAP-pwd implementation.
A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake would likely be
applicable against the EAP-pwd implementation. Even though the
wpa_supplicant/hostapd PWE derivation iteration for EAP-pwd has
protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack might
enable an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the
iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim
machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a
JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on
the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged
applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared
cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs).
The attacker could use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full recovery of the used password if that password is
not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks.
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on an authentication server
(EAP server), so the most likely target for this would be a client
device using EAP-pwd.
The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the EAP-pwd
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with EAP-pwd support
(CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y in the build configuration and EAP-pwd being enabled
in the runtime configuration).
It should also be noted that older versions of wpa_supplicant/hostapd
prior to v2.7 did not include additional protection against certain
timing differences. The definition of the EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) does not
describe such protection, but the same issue that was addressed in SAE
earlier can be applicable against EAP-pwd as well and as such, that
implementation specific extra protection (commit 22ac3dfebf7b, "EAP-pwd:
Mask timing of PWE derivation") is needed to avoid showing externally
visible timing differences that could leak information about the
password. Any uses of older wpa_supplicant/hostapd versions with EAP-pwd
are recommended to update to v2.7 or newer in addition to the mitigation
steps listed below for the more recently discovered issue.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
Add helper functions for constant time operations
OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
EAP-pwd: Use constant time and memory access for finding the PWE
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-2/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
SAE side-channel attacks
Published: April 10, 2019
Identifiers:
- VU#871675
- CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE)
Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/
Vulnerability
Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE
implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant
(infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous
Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered
side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used
password based on observable timing differences and cache access
patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with
an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to
protect against dictionary attacks.
Cache attack
A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This
attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory
group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this
attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE
derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this
new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code
branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run
unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a
smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a
web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient
protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory
access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case
with today's designs).
The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn
information about the password and combine this information from number
of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With
sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this
might result in full discovery of the used password.
This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the
target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the
most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an
infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS.
The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE
implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE
derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory
access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from
operations that depend on the password even for the case where the
attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device.
Timing attack
The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the
PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing
differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were
needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC
addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker
may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able
to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password
is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack
could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a
station enabling the specific MODP groups.
This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled
explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups
parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these
groups by default.
While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing
additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that
the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the
current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is
discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the
implementation are included.
Vulnerable versions/configurations
All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y
in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime
configuration).
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen
(Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on
how to address them.
Possible mitigation steps
- Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild:
OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums
Add helper functions for constant time operations
OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre()
SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation
SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind()
SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24
SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC
SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc()
These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/
- Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available
- In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups
1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant
sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly
enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet
current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related
to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in
the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note
that all these groups have been disabled by default in all
hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if
explicitly enabled in the configuration.
- Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks
Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
[bump PKG_RELEASE]
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
With this change, the file is reduced from 5186 bytes to 4649 bytes that
its approximately 10.5 percent less memory consumption. For small
devices, sometimes every byte counts.
Also, all other protocol handler use tabs instead of spaces.
Signed-off-by: Florian Eckert <fe@dev.tdt.de>
Fix dbclient regression in 2019.77. After exiting the terminal would be left
in a bad state. Reported by Ryan Woodsmall
drop patch applied upstream:
010-tty-modes-werent-reset-for-client.patch
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
* allowedips: initialize list head when removing intermediate nodes
Fix for an important regression in removing allowed IPs from the last
snapshot. We have new test cases to catch these in the future as well.
* tools: warn if an AllowedIP has a nonzero host part
If you try to run `wg set wg0 peer ... allowed-ips 192.168.1.82/24`, wg(8)
will now print a warning. Even though we mask this automatically down to
192.168.1.0/24, usually when people specify it like this, it's a mistake.
* wg-quick: add 'strip' subcommand
The new strip subcommand prints the config file to stdout after stripping
it of all wg-quick-specific options. This enables tricks such as:
`wg addconf $DEV <(wg-quick strip $DEV)`.
* tools: avoid unneccessary next_peer assignments in sort_peers()
Small C optimization the compiler was probably already doing.
* peerlookup: rename from hashtables
* allowedips: do not use __always_inline
* device: use skb accessor functions where possible
Suggested tweaks from Dave Miller.
* blake2s: simplify
* blake2s: remove outlen parameter from final
The blake2s implementation has been simplified, since we don't use any of the
fancy tree hashing parameters or the like. We also no longer separate the
output length at initialization time from the output length at finalization
time.
* global: the _bh variety of rcu helpers have been unified
* compat: nf_nat_core.h was removed upstream
* compat: backport skb_mark_not_on_list
The usual assortment of compat fixes for Linux 5.1.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
OpenVPN as of 2.4.7 uses some OpenSSL APIs that are deprecated in
OpenSSL >= 1.1.0.
Signed-off-by: Magnus Kroken <mkroken@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com> [white space fix]
361b3e4 proto-shell: return error in case setup fails
a97297d interface: set interface in TEARDOWN state when checking link state
Signed-off-by: Hans Dedecker <dedeckeh@gmail.com>
c2cfe9d iwinfo: Fix 802.11ad channel to frequency
Fixes 9725aa271a ("iwinfo: update to latest git HEAD")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Instead of creating host-routes depending on fwmark as (accidentally)
pushed by commit
1e8bb50b93 ("wireguard: do not add host-dependencies if fwmark is set")
use a new config option 'nohostroute' to explicitely prevent creation
of the route to the endpoint.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
The 'fwmark' option is used to define routing traffic to
wireguard endpoints to go through specific routing tables.
In that case it doesn't make sense to setup routes for
host-dependencies in the 'main' table, so skip setting host
dependencies if 'fwmark' is set.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
- limit ECC support to ec*-sha2-nistp256:
* DROPBEAR_ECC now provides only basic support for ECC
- provide full ECC support as an option:
* DROPBEAR_ECC_FULL brings back support for ec{dh,dsa}-sha2-nistp{384,521}
- update feature costs in binary size
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
* option "keyfile" is more generic than "rsakeyfile".
* option "rsakeyfile" is considered to be deprecated and should be removed
in future releases.
* warn user (in syslog) if option "rsakeyfile" is used
* better check options ("rsakeyfile" and "keyfile"): don't append
"-r keyfile" to command line if file is absent (doesn't exist or empty),
warn user (in syslog) about such files
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
Felix Fietkau pointed out that bundled libtomcrypt/libtommath do funny stuff with CFLAGS.
fix this with checking environment variable OPENWRT_BUILD in both libs.
change in dropbear binary size is drastical: 221621 -> 164277.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
compiler complains about messed up CFLAGS in build log:
<command-line>: warning: "_FORTIFY_SOURCE" redefined
<command-line>: note: this is the location of the previous definition
and then linker fails:
mips-openwrt-linux-musl-gcc [...] -o dropbearmulti [...]
collect2: fatal error: ld terminated with signal 11 [Segmentation fault]
compilation terminated.
/staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans0.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `cipher_descriptor' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
/staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans1.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `ses' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
/staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: /tmp/cc27zORz.ltrans2.ltrans.o: relocation R_MIPS_HI16 against `cipher_descriptor' can not be used when making a shared object; recompile with -fPIC
/staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: BFD (GNU Binutils) 2.31.1 assertion fail elfxx-mips.c:6550
[...]
/staging_dir/toolchain-mips_24kc_gcc-8.2.0_musl/mips-openwrt-linux-musl/bin/ld: BFD (GNU Binutils) 2.31.1 assertion fail elfxx-mips.c:6550
make[3]: *** [Makefile:198: dropbearmulti] Error 1
make[3]: *** Deleting file 'dropbearmulti'
make[3]: Leaving directory '/build_dir/target-mips_24kc_musl/dropbear-2018.76'
make[2]: *** [Makefile:158: /build_dir/target-mips_24kc_musl/dropbear-2018.76/.built] Error 2
make[2]: Leaving directory '/package/network/services/dropbear'
This FTBFS issue was caused by hardening flags set up by dropbear's configure script.
By default, Dropbear offers hardening via CFLAGS and LDFLAGS,
but this may break or confuse OpenWrt settings.
Remove most Dropbear's hardening settings in favour of precise build,
but preserve Spectre v2 mitigations:
* -mfunction-return=thunk
* -mindirect-branch=thunk
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Demin <rockdrilla@gmail.com>
Hans Dedecker