This patch adds profiles and support for building factory and
sysupgrade images for JHR-N805R, JHR-N825R and JHR-N926R.
Signed-off-by: Reinhard Max <reinhard@m4x.de>
Reviewed-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
SVN-Revision: 48906
This patch adds support for JHR-N805R, JHR-N825R and JHR-N926R to
various scripts in the base-files directory.
Signed-off-by: Reinhard Max <reinhard@m4x.de>
Reviewed-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
SVN-Revision: 48905
Add a device tree for JCG JHR-N825R
This router is based on a RT3052 and has 4MB of CFI flash and 32MB of
SDRAM. As a special feature, it comes with a two digit seven segment
display that is connected to a pair of daisy-chained 74164 shift
registers that can be controlled via GPIOs.
For details, see https://wikidevi.com/wiki/JCG_JHR-N825R .
Signed-off-by: Reinhard Max <reinhard@m4x.de>
Reviewed-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
SVN-Revision: 48904
Add a device tree for JCG JHR-N825R
This router is based on a RT3052 and has 4MB of CFI flash and 32MB of
SDRAM. For details, see https://wikidevi.com/wiki/JCG_JHR-N825R .
Signed-off-by: Reinhard Max <reinhard@m4x.de>
Reviewed-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
SVN-Revision: 48903
Add a device tree for JCG JHR-N805R
This router is based on a RT3050 and has 4MB of SPI flash and 16MB of
SDRAM. For details, see https://wikidevi.com/wiki/JCG_JHR-N805R .
Signed-off-by: Reinhard Max <reinhard@m4x.de>
Reviewed-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
SVN-Revision: 48902
Without the IRQF_ONESHOT flag in devm_request_threaded_irq() call I get
following error:
genirq: Threaded irq requested with handler=NULL and !ONESHOT for irq 56
gpio-keys gpio-keys: failed to request irq:56 for gpio:20
>From kernel/irq/manage.c:
The interrupt was requested with handler = NULL, so we use the default
primary handler for it. But it does not have the oneshot flag set. In
combination with level interrupts this is deadly, because the default
primary handler just wakes the thread, then the irq lines is reenabled,
but the device still has the level irq asserted. Rinse and repeat....
While this works for edge type interrupts, we play it safe and reject
unconditionally because we can't say for sure which type this interrupt
really has. The type flags are unreliable as the underlying chip
implementation can override them.
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
SVN-Revision: 48894
Commit d0f5ab6d95a1 ("ramips: Added support for ZBT-826 / ZBT-1026")
incorrectly changed the mode of the ramips shell scripts from 755 to 644.
I.e., they are not excutable any more and for example devices will be left
with broken configs.
Signed-off-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com>
SVN-Revision: 48893
The image_check currently fails when it cannot read all magic bytes in a
single chunk. But this can happen when the data are read from a pipe. This
currently breaks the openmesh.sh upgrade script with musl because it uses
dd with a blocksize of 1 to copy the image file to the mtd process.
The read can simply be repeated until enough bytes are read for the magic
byte check. It only stops when either an error was returned or 0 bytes were
read.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven.eckelmann@open-mesh.com>
SVN-Revision: 48891
It was noticed that the system can hang during the reboot before the kernel
actually triggers the system reset and before all processes are stopped. The
watchdog didn't automatically restart the system because the om-watchdog
process was still running and triggering the hardware watchdog.
Instead the system should stop the watchdog during the shutdown to get the
benefit of an hardware reset in case of an software related problem. This stop
can be done quite easily with procd because it keeps track of its started
processes.
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven.eckelmann@open-mesh.com>
SVN-Revision: 48889
This tool creates factory images for JCG routers.
Details can be found in the header comment of jcgimage.c.
Signed-off-by: Reinhard Max <reinhard@m4x.de>
Reviewed-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
SVN-Revision: 48888
Enable access to GPIO chip and its pins for Atheros AR92xx
wireless devices. For now AR9285 and AR9287 are supported.
Signed-off-by: Michal Cieslakiewicz <michal.cieslakiewicz@wp.pl>
Acked-by: Hartmut Knaack <knaack.h@gmx.de>
SVN-Revision: 48881
Support default state for platform LEDs connected to ath9k device.
Now LEDs are correctly set on or off at ath9k module initialization.
Signed-off-by: Michal Cieslakiewicz <michal.cieslakiewicz@wp.pl>
Acked-by: Hartmut Knaack <knaack.h@gmx.de>
SVN-Revision: 48880
Enable platform-supplied WLAN LED name for ath9k device.
Signed-off-by: Michal Cieslakiewicz <michal.cieslakiewicz@wp.pl>
Acked-by: Hartmut Knaack <knaack.h@gmx.de>
SVN-Revision: 48879
CVE-2016-0704
s2_srvr.c overwrite the wrong bytes in the master-key when applying
Bleichenbacher protection for export cipher suites. This provides a
Bleichenbacher oracle, and could potentially allow more efficient variants of
the DROWN attack.
CVE-2016-0703
s2_srvr.c did not enforce that clear-key-length is 0 for non-export ciphers.
If clear-key bytes are present for these ciphers, they *displace* encrypted-key
bytes. This leads to an efficient divide-and-conquer key recovery attack: if
an eavesdropper has intercepted an SSLv2 handshake, they can use the server as
an oracle to determine the SSLv2 master-key, using only 16 connections to the
server and negligible computation. More importantly, this leads to a more
efficient version of DROWN that is effective against non-export ciphersuites,
and requires no significant computation.
CVE-2016-0702
A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of
RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on an
attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same hyper-
threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
CVE-2016-0799
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally
the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory
location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory
allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size
of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in
processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur.
The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is
passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in
this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions
when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications
that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources.
OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out
ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is
not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via
remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these
issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
CVE-2016-0797
In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an int
value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large
values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because
|i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL
leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the
calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this case
memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is insufficiently
sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn. This
could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever called by user
applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is anticipated to be
a rare occurrence. All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that
is not expected to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command
line arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
CVE-2016-0798
The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing memory
management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly allocated, and
sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no way of distinguishing
these two cases. Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide
valid login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker connecting
with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around 300 bytes per
connection. Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not
configure a seed are not vulnerable. In Apache, the seed directive is known as
SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed. To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.
Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However, note
that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the indistinguishability of valid
and invalid logins. In particular, computations are currently not carried out
in constant time.
CVE-2016-0705
A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys
and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that
receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered
rare.
CVE-2016-0800
A cross-protocol attack was discovered that could lead to decryption of TLS
sessions by using a server supporting SSLv2 and EXPORT cipher suites as a
Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle. Note that traffic between clients and non-
vulnerable servers can be decrypted provided another server supporting SSLv2
and EXPORT ciphers (even with a different protocol such as SMTP, IMAP or POP)
shares the RSA keys of the non-vulnerable server. This vulnerability is known
as DROWN (CVE-2016-0800). Recovering one session key requires the attacker to
perform approximately 2^50 computation, as well as thousands of connections to
the affected server. A more efficient variant of the DROWN attack exists
against unpatched OpenSSL servers using versions that predate 1.0.2a, 1.0.1m,
1.0.0r and 0.9.8zf released on 19/Mar/2015 (see CVE-2016-0703 below). Users can
avoid this issue by disabling the SSLv2 protocol in all their SSL/TLS servers,
if they've not done so already. Disabling all SSLv2 ciphers is also sufficient,
provided the patches for CVE-2015-3197 (fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.1r and 1.0.2f)
have been deployed. Servers that have not disabled the SSLv2 protocol, and are
not patched for CVE-2015-3197 are vulnerable to DROWN even if all SSLv2
ciphers are nominally disabled, because malicious clients can force the use of
SSLv2 with EXPORT ciphers. OpenSSL 1.0.2g and 1.0.1s deploy the following
mitigation against DROWN: SSLv2 is now by default disabled at build-time.
Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2.
Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the
version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of:
SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl,
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the
application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client
or server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery
have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2
56-bit DES are no longer available. In addition, weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up
are now disabled in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured
with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength
ciphers.
Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jow@openwrt.org>
SVN-Revision: 48868
Opkg now uses sha256 by default and expects them. Making it optionally
understand md5s also and detect md5 sum so we can migrate from configuration
that used md5.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hrusecky <Michal.Hrusecky@nic.cz>
SVN-Revision: 48867
This patch moves the OOLITE profile code into the overarching Gainstrong
profile and deletes the old single profile file.
Signed-off by: Stijn Segers <francesco.borromini@inventati.org>
SVN-Revision: 48866
Move the `--recursive` switch from `git clone` to `git submodule`
so that submodules are cloned for upstream branches where the
PKG_SOURCE_VERSION commit-ish has a different .gitmodules
configuration than the repository default.
This is, for example, required when the master branch for a source
package does not use submodules, but its topic branch for OpenWRT
does.
This changes the buildroot dependency from git-1.6.2 to git 1.7.12.2,
which was released September 2012.
Signed-off-by: Darik Horn <dajhorn@vanadac.com>
Signed-off-by: Karl Palsson <karlp@tweak.net.au>
SVN-Revision: 48830
The new u-boot version bundled with the 5.6.x firmwares from Ubiquiti gets
confused by the smaller rootfs partition size; this can lead to various
issues:
1. We've gotten reports that flashing from the 5.6.x stock firmware to
OpenWrt will brick devices; I wasn't able to reproduce this myself
2. Flashing from 5.5.x stock firmware to OpenWrt and back to stock (via
TFTP recovery), following by an update to 5.6.x via web interface can
yield a bricked device with the following properties:
- It can't be booted without entering commands over a serial console, as
u-boot supplies the wrong MTD layout
- The web interface won't accept any image with the original flash
layout, so stock firmware upgrades are impossible
- As the TFTP recovery doesn't update u-boot, returning to the old
u-boot from firmware 5.5.x is impossible
To recover from 2., creating an OpenWrt image which doesn't set u-boot as
read-only and flashing a backup of the old u-boot from there is the only
way known to me. (Fixing the mtdparts variable in u-boot-env from OpenWrt
might also work; settings this from u-boot over serial didn't have
any permanent effect.)
Fix all of this by setting the correct flash layout also used by the stock
firmware. Flashing has been tested from both firmware 5.5.x and 5.6.x. The
fixed layout also matches the mtdparts defined by OpenWrt.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
SVN-Revision: 48829
The ubdev01 profile defines its own MTDPARTS with smaller firmware
partition, so give it its own UBNT_BOARD in mkfwimage.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@universe-factory.net>
SVN-Revision: 48828
This will be used to create a diff between the Lantiq annex A and the
annex B firmware.
Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
SVN-Revision: 48810
Enable setting a host-specific lease time for static hosts.
The new option is called "leasetime" and the format is similar
as for the default lease time: e.g. 12h, 3d, infinite
Default lease time is used for all hosts for which there is
no host-specific definition.
The option is added to /etc/config/dhcp for the selected hosts:
config host
option name 'Nexus'
option mac 'd8:50:66:55:59:7c'
option ip '192.168.1.245'
option leasetime '2h'
It gets appended to /var/etc/dnsmasq.conf like this:
dhcp-host=d8:50:66:55:59:7c,192.168.1.245,Nexus,2h
Signed-off-by: Hannu Nyman <hannu.nyman@iki.fi>
SVN-Revision: 48801
There are time that programs need to be notified of events from
subsystems that are not enumerated in the .json definition, e.g. QEMU
guest agent by default requires /dev/virtio-ports/org.qemu.guest_agent.0
which is a symlink to /dev/vportMpN from virtio-ports subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Yousong Zhou <yszhou4tech@gmail.com>
SVN-Revision: 48799
John Crispin