While these changes are not included in the advisory, upstream encourages users to merge them. See http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2017-October/037989.html Signed-off-by: Stijn Tintel <stijn@linux-ipv6.be>master
Stijn Tintel
7 years ago
parent
3db529d5cc
commit
2127425434
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ |
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From a00e946c1c9a1f9cc65c72900d2a444ceb1f872e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
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Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2017 23:53:01 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Extra defense against PTK reinstalls in 4-way handshake
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Currently, reinstallations of the PTK are prevented by (1) assuring the
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same TPTK is only set once as the PTK, and (2) that one particular PTK
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is only installed once. This patch makes it more explicit that point (1)
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is required to prevent key reinstallations. At the same time, this patch
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hardens wpa_supplicant such that future changes do not accidentally
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break this property.
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Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
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---
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src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 8 ++++++++
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1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
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--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
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+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
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@@ -1728,6 +1728,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
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sm->ptk_set = 1;
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os_memcpy(&sm->ptk, &sm->tptk, sizeof(sm->ptk));
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os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
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+ /*
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+ * This assures the same TPTK in sm->tptk can never be
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+ * copied twice to sm->pkt as the new PTK. In
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+ * combination with the installed flag in the wpa_ptk
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+ * struct, this assures the same PTK is only installed
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+ * once.
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+ */
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+ sm->renew_snonce = 1;
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}
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ |
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From b488a12948751f57871f09baa345e59b23959a41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 13:18:02 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH] Clear PMK length and check for this when deriving PTK
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Instead of setting the default PMK length for the cleared PMK, set the
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length to 0 and explicitly check for this when deriving PTK to avoid
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unexpected key derivation with an all-zeroes key should it be possible
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to somehow trigger PTK derivation to happen before PMK derivation.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/common/wpa_common.c | 5 +++++
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src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 ++++---
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2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
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+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
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@@ -225,6 +225,11 @@ int wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t
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u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN];
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size_t ptk_len;
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+ if (pmk_len == 0) {
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: No PMK set for PT derivation");
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
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os_memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
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os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
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--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
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+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
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@@ -584,7 +584,8 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_
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/* Calculate PTK which will be stored as a temporary PTK until it has
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* been verified when processing message 3/4. */
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ptk = &sm->tptk;
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- wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk);
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+ if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm, src_addr, key, ptk) < 0)
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+ goto failed;
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if (sm->pairwise_cipher == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
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u8 buf[8];
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/* Supplicant: swap tx/rx Mic keys */
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@@ -2705,8 +2706,8 @@ void wpa_sm_set_pmk_from_pmksa(struct wp
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sm->pmk_len = sm->cur_pmksa->pmk_len;
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os_memcpy(sm->pmk, sm->cur_pmksa->pmk, sm->pmk_len);
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} else {
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- sm->pmk_len = PMK_LEN;
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- os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN);
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+ sm->pmk_len = 0;
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+ os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, PMK_LEN_MAX);
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}
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,221 @@ |
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From 6f234c1e2ee1ede29f2412b7012b3345ed8e52d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 18:37:43 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH] Optional AP side workaround for key reinstallation attacks
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This adds a new hostapd configuration parameter
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wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1 that can be used to disable
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retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that are used to install
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keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This is
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similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
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wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4
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retries and with extended timeout for messages 4/4 and group
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message 2/2 to avoid causing issues with stations that may use
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aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
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EAPOL-Key messages.
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This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks
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on the station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices
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cannot be updated for some reason. By removing the
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retransmissions the attacker cannot cause key reinstallation with
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a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the station side
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vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
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CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
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This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced
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robustness of key negotiation especially in environments with
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heavy traffic load due to the number of attempts to perform the
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key exchange is reduced significantly. As such, this workaround
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is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
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configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
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It is also possible to enable this in the build by default by
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adding the following to the build configuration:
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CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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hostapd/config_file.c | 2 ++
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hostapd/defconfig | 4 ++++
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hostapd/hostapd.conf | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
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src/ap/ap_config.c | 6 ++++++
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src/ap/ap_config.h | 1 +
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src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
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src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 1 +
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src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c | 2 ++
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8 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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--- a/hostapd/config_file.c
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+++ b/hostapd/config_file.c
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@@ -2542,6 +2542,8 @@ static int hostapd_config_fill(struct ho
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return 1;
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}
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bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = (u32) val;
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+ } else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries") == 0) {
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+ bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries = atoi(pos);
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} else if (os_strcmp(buf, "wpa_passphrase") == 0) {
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int len = os_strlen(pos);
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if (len < 8 || len > 63) {
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--- a/hostapd/defconfig
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+++ b/hostapd/defconfig
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@@ -372,3 +372,7 @@ CONFIG_IPV6=y
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# Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE)
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# Experimental implementation of draft-harkins-owe-07.txt
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#CONFIG_OWE=y
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+
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+# Override default value for the wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries configuration
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+# parameter. See that parameter in hostapd.conf for more details.
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+#CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES=1
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--- a/hostapd/hostapd.conf
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+++ b/hostapd/hostapd.conf
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@@ -1315,6 +1315,30 @@ own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1
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# Range 1..4294967295; default: 4
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#wpa_pairwise_update_count=4
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+# Workaround for key reinstallation attacks
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+#
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+# This parameter can be used to disable retransmission of EAPOL-Key frames that
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+# are used to install keys (EAPOL-Key message 3/4 and group message 1/2). This
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+# is similar to setting wpa_group_update_count=1 and
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+# wpa_pairwise_update_count=1, but with no impact to message 1/4 and with
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+# extended timeout on the response to avoid causing issues with stations that
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+# may use aggressive power saving have very long time in replying to the
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+# EAPOL-Key messages.
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+#
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+# This option can be used to work around key reinstallation attacks on the
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+# station (supplicant) side in cases those station devices cannot be updated
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+# for some reason. By removing the retransmissions the attacker cannot cause
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+# key reinstallation with a delayed frame transmission. This is related to the
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+# station side vulnerabilities CVE-2017-13077, CVE-2017-13078, CVE-2017-13079,
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+# CVE-2017-13080, and CVE-2017-13081.
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+#
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+# This workaround might cause interoperability issues and reduced robustness of
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+# key negotiation especially in environments with heavy traffic load due to the
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+# number of attempts to perform the key exchange is reduced significantly. As
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+# such, this workaround is disabled by default (unless overridden in build
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+# configuration). To enable this, set the parameter to 1.
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+#wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries=1
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+
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# Enable IEEE 802.11i/RSN/WPA2 pre-authentication. This is used to speed up
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# roaming be pre-authenticating IEEE 802.1X/EAP part of the full RSN
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# authentication and key handshake before actually associating with a new AP.
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--- a/src/ap/ap_config.c
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+++ b/src/ap/ap_config.c
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@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ static void hostapd_config_free_vlan(str
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}
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+#ifndef DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES
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+#define DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES 0
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+#endif /* DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES */
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+
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void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct hostapd_bss_config *bss)
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{
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dl_list_init(&bss->anqp_elem);
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@@ -58,6 +62,8 @@ void hostapd_config_defaults_bss(struct
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bss->wpa_gmk_rekey = 86400;
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bss->wpa_group_update_count = 4;
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bss->wpa_pairwise_update_count = 4;
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+ bss->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries =
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+ DEFAULT_WPA_DISABLE_EAPOL_KEY_RETRIES;
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bss->wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK;
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bss->wpa_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
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bss->wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP;
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--- a/src/ap/ap_config.h
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+++ b/src/ap/ap_config.h
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@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ struct hostapd_bss_config {
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int wpa_ptk_rekey;
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u32 wpa_group_update_count;
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u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
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+ int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
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int rsn_pairwise;
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int rsn_preauth;
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char *rsn_preauth_interfaces;
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--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
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+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
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@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wp
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static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
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static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
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static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
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+static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans = 4000; /* ms */
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/* TODO: make these configurable */
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static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
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@@ -1653,6 +1654,9 @@ static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_au
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eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
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else
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timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
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+ if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
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+ (!pairwise || (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)))
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+ timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans;
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if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
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sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
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@@ -2882,6 +2886,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
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sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
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sm->TimeoutCtr++;
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+ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
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+ sm->TimeoutCtr > 1) {
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+ /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
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+ return;
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+ }
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if (sm->TimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
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/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
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* immediately following this. */
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@@ -3220,7 +3229,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
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sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
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SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
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else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
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- sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count) {
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+ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_pairwise_update_count ||
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+ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
|
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+ sm->TimeoutCtr > 1)) {
|
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wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
|
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wpa_auth_vlogger(
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sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
|
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@@ -3260,6 +3271,11 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING
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SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
|
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|
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sm->GTimeoutCtr++;
|
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+ if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
|
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+ sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1) {
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+ /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
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+ return;
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+ }
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if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count) {
|
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/* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
|
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* immediately following this. */
|
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@@ -3363,7 +3379,9 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
|
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!sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
|
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SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
|
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else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
|
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- sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count)
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+ sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_update_count ||
|
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+ (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries &&
|
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+ sm->GTimeoutCtr > 1))
|
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SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
|
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else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
|
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SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
|
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--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
|
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+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
|
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@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ struct wpa_auth_config {
|
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int wpa_ptk_rekey;
|
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u32 wpa_group_update_count;
|
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u32 wpa_pairwise_update_count;
|
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+ int wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
|
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int rsn_pairwise;
|
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int rsn_preauth;
|
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int eapol_version;
|
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--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
|
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+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_glue.c
|
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@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ static void hostapd_wpa_auth_conf(struct
|
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wconf->wpa_gmk_rekey = conf->wpa_gmk_rekey;
|
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wconf->wpa_ptk_rekey = conf->wpa_ptk_rekey;
|
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wconf->wpa_group_update_count = conf->wpa_group_update_count;
|
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+ wconf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries =
|
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+ conf->wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries;
|
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wconf->wpa_pairwise_update_count = conf->wpa_pairwise_update_count;
|
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wconf->rsn_pairwise = conf->rsn_pairwise;
|
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wconf->rsn_preauth = conf->rsn_preauth;
|
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@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ |
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From a6ea665300919d6a3af22b1f4237203647fda93a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
|
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Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 00:01:11 +0300
|
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Subject: [PATCH] Additional consistentcy checks for PTK component lengths
|
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|
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Verify that TK, KCK, and KEK lengths are set to consistent values within
|
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struct wpa_ptk before using them in supplicant. This is an additional
|
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layer of protection against unexpected states.
|
||||
|
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
|
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---
|
||||
src/common/wpa_common.c | 6 ++++++
|
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src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------
|
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2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
|
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|
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--- a/src/common/wpa_common.c
|
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+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.c
|
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@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@ int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, siz
|
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{
|
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u8 hash[SHA512_MAC_LEN];
|
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|
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+ if (key_len == 0) {
|
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
||||
+ "WPA: KCK not set - cannot calculate MIC");
|
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+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
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switch (ver) {
|
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#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
|
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case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4:
|
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--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
|
||||
@@ -725,6 +725,11 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st
|
||||
|
||||
alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
|
||||
keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
|
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+ if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
|
||||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK length mismatch: %d != %lu",
|
||||
+ keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
|
||||
|
||||
if (sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) {
|
||||
@@ -745,6 +750,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st
|
||||
|
||||
/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
|
||||
os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
|
||||
+ sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
|
||||
sm->ptk.installed = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
|
||||
@@ -1717,9 +1723,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
|
||||
os_memcpy(mic, key + 1, mic_len);
|
||||
if (sm->tptk_set) {
|
||||
os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
|
||||
- wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
|
||||
- ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
|
||||
- if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
|
||||
+ if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->tptk.kck, sm->tptk.kck_len,
|
||||
+ sm->key_mgmt,
|
||||
+ ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
|
||||
+ os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
|
||||
wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
|
||||
"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC "
|
||||
"when using TPTK - ignoring TPTK");
|
||||
@@ -1742,9 +1749,10 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_verify_eapol_k
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ok && sm->ptk_set) {
|
||||
os_memset(key + 1, 0, mic_len);
|
||||
- wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len, sm->key_mgmt,
|
||||
- ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1));
|
||||
- if (os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
|
||||
+ if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->ptk.kck, sm->ptk.kck_len,
|
||||
+ sm->key_mgmt,
|
||||
+ ver, buf, len, (u8 *) (key + 1)) < 0 ||
|
||||
+ os_memcmp_const(mic, key + 1, mic_len) != 0) {
|
||||
wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
|
||||
"WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key MIC - "
|
||||
"dropping packet");
|
||||
@@ -4167,6 +4175,11 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_s
|
||||
|
||||
alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise_cipher);
|
||||
keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
|
||||
+ if (keylen <= 0 || (unsigned int) keylen != sm->ptk.tk_len) {
|
||||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK length mismatch: %u != %lu",
|
||||
+ keylen, (long unsigned int) sm->ptk.tk_len);
|
||||
+ goto fail;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
rsclen = wpa_cipher_rsc_len(sm->pairwise_cipher);
|
||||
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Set TK to driver",
|
||||
sm->ptk.tk, keylen);
|
||||
@@ -4183,6 +4196,7 @@ int fils_process_assoc_resp(struct wpa_s
|
||||
* takes care of association frame encryption/decryption. */
|
||||
/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
|
||||
os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
|
||||
+ sm->ptk.tk_len = 0;
|
||||
sm->ptk.installed = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* FILS HLP Container */
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ |
||||
From c0fe5f125a9d4a6564e1f4956ccc3809bf2fd69d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 01:15:24 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Clear BSSID information in supplicant state machine on
|
||||
disconnection
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes a corner case where RSN pre-authentication candidate from
|
||||
scan results was ignored if the station was associated with that BSS
|
||||
just before running the new scan for the connection.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
|
||||
@@ -2662,6 +2662,7 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_s
|
||||
wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
|
||||
|
||||
sm->msg_3_of_4_ok = 0;
|
||||
+ os_memset(sm->bssid, 0, ETH_ALEN);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in new issue